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Introduction 
The American “War on Drugs” is the most expensive federal effort to assert 
control over the personal behavior of American citizens. In 2009 alone President Barack 
Obama requested a budget of $15.1 billion for federal drug enforcement efforts for the 
fiscal year of 2010.
1
 This international and domestic campaign to criminalize and 
propagandize against “drugs” was ground-breaking. Although dubbed the “War on 
Drugs” by President Richard Nixon in 1971, this federal drug war existed for more than 
half a century prior to Nixon’s declaration.2 Waging a war over a social issue was a 
dramatic move for the United States. This innovative legal and social campaign changed 
the face of the nation, creating a new class of criminals, and adding to an ever increasing 
national debt. The roots of this “war” are found in the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, 
Prohibition, and the Volstead Act of 1919, among other laws. Despite its roots or perhaps 
because of them, the motives and methods of the federal government significantly 
changed over the course of the twentieth century. When and why did the U.S. federal 
government initially embark on this “War on Drugs?” When and why did it focus on 
cannabis? Who were the key actors in the war’s creation and perpetuation? What specific 
methods did the federal government use to fight this war? The U.S. “War on Drugs,” 
specifically the anti-marijuana campaign, was at its core a struggle by the federal 
government to define the meaning of Cannabis sativa Linne, trying to establish both the 
legal and cultural definition of the cannabis plant. I will discuss the evolution of the 
federal drug war against cannabis as well as provide a chronology of key events and laws 
                                                          
1
 The White House Office of Drug Control Policy, “National Drug Control Strategy: FY 2010 Budget 
Summary,” May 2009. accessed November 23, 2011 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/fy10budget.pdf 
2
 Martin Alan Greenberg, Prohibition Enforcement: Charting a New Mission (Springfield, IL: Charles C. 
Thomas Publisher Ltd., 1999), 196. 
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from the 1920s to the 1980s. My primary foci are the evolution of this “War on Drugs” 
between 1937 and the 1980s and the cultural metamorphosis of the American cannabis 
plant from hemp to marijuana. I will focus specifically on the federal government’s 
means and motives in this war.  
Hundreds of scholars have written about the American War on Drugs, yet an 
analysis of evolution of the cannabis plant’s relationship with the federal government 
with specific focus on the government’s tactics used to change the cultural and legal 
definition of that plant would be a significant contribution to the current scholarly 
discussion. Much of the scholarship regarding the U.S. War on Drugs focuses on 
international drug policy; drug trafficking and foreign policy rather than U.S. domestic 
drug policy, which is more relevant to my lines of inquiry. Academic scholarship often 
couches the War on Drugs almost exclusively in terms of drug policy, interdiction, and 
enforcement. Therefore, the academic picture of the American drug war is filled with 
addicts, criminals, drug traffickers, drug schedules, and law enforcement. These fields of 
inquiry are not to be discounted, but drug policy is not solely represented by the criminal 
justice system. The anti-drug media campaign is also an instrument of policy, a weapon 
used to assert the legal and cultural dominance of the federal government over 
individuals and “pro-marijuana” state laws. 
Throughout recorded history cannabis “has been extolled as one of man’s greatest 
benefactors--and cursed as one of his greatest scourges.”3 From mandatory hemp farming 
in the Jamestown colony to modern medicinal use of marijuana, the cannabis plant shares 
a varied and complex relationship with Americans.
4
 This simple plant with five-fingered 
                                                          
3
 Ernest L. Abel, Marihuana: The First Twelve Thousand Years (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), ix. 
4
Ibid., 77. 
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leaves symbolizes evil for some, pleasure for others, and medical help for many. Recent 
historical research regarding Cannabis sativa includes a variety of themes, including the 
history of marijuana, marijuana prohibition, and marijuana and media. The 
historiography of cannabis has its roots in medical history, domestic and international 
drug control policy, cultural history, anthropology, and sociology. Contemporary 
historians of cannabis have sought to illuminate the history of man’s very complex 
relationship with this plant. This enterprise is complicated by the polemic nature of the 
topic. A fair and balanced assessment of the subject matter is integral. The goal of my 
study is to understand the history of cannabis in various contexts of change, to illuminate 
the very complexity that defines man’s relationship with this plant and its duality. 
One cannot discuss marijuana prohibition, however, without first examining drug 
prohibition in America in general, particularly in the twentieth century. The War on 
Drugs, after all, does not solely concern itself with cannabis. The histories of the 
prohibition of other substances such as alcohol, opium, heroin, and cocaine can only 
serve to inform and strengthen my arguments. The historiography of drug prohibition in 
the United States is as complex as the individual histories of the aforementioned drugs. 
Considering a sample of the historiography of drug prohibition in the United States will 
thus enable me to better understand the history of drug prohibition itself. 
Prohibition of alcohol is a widely discussed subject in the historiography of drug 
prohibition. There are a variety of arguments that dominate the debate regarding 
Prohibition. One point that is almost universally agreed upon was the inevitability of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. Among these scholars who agree with this assertion are Peter 
Odegard, Paul A. Carter, Thomas R. Pegram, and Martin Alan Greenberg.  
4 
 
Most scholars of Prohibition also believe in the inevitability of its downfall. 
David Kyvig, a historian at the University of Akron, challenged this belief in his book 
Repealing National Prohibition, asserting political and social forces worked in tandem 
towards the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and that the outcome was in no way 
inevitable.
5
 Kyvig drew upon documents from the groups such as the Association Against 
the Prohibition Amendment and Women’s Organization for National Prohibition Reform, 
exploring the influence a group of elites had on the repeal of alcohol prohibition.  
Many Prohibition scholars debate over the impetus behind the Eighteenth 
Amendment. Most scholars agree that the temperance movement was at its heart a 
grassroots movement and it was this movement that spurred local, state, and finally 
national efforts towards banning alcohol. In Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-
Saloon League Peter H. Odegard closely examined the archives of the Anti-Saloon 
League and one of its chief opponents, the United States Brewers’ Association.6 Odegard 
was able to illustrate the various pressures that these and other similar lobbying/activist 
groups exerted on state and national governments regarding temperance and outright 
alcohol prohibition. According to Odegard, this type of pressure politics was the very 
reason behind Prohibition. This sociopolitical history is unique in its attempt to study the 
temperance movement from both sides. Typically scholarship on the movement deals 
primarily with the “wet” organizations or the “dry” organizations and does not attempt to 
analyze their connections.  
According to some scholars, individual groups’ interests led them to join the 
temperance bandwagon in hopes of furthering their individual cause in the process. 
                                                          
5
 David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, 2
nd
 ed. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000). 
6
 Peter H. Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York: Octagon Books, 
1966). 
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Among these scholars is Thomas R. Pegram. In Battling Demon Rum Pegram, a historian 
at Loyola College at Baltimore, attempted to place temperance activism in the framework 
of America’s changing political parties and the nation’s political culture.7 Pegram showed 
that temperance activists pushed for Prohibition, in part, to support their own individual 
issues. For instance, female reformers used the temperance movement to promote 
women’s involvement in political life. He concluded that their rhetoric had little to no 
connection to the quantity of alcohol consumed. 
Other scholars placed race and ethnicity firmly in the forefront of the academic 
discussion regarding the impetus behind Prohibition. Among these scholars is Martin 
Alan Greenberg. In Prohibition Enforcement: Charting a New Mission Greenberg placed 
race firmly in the center of the temperance movement, claiming that it was not so much 
about controlling the flow of alcohol, but controlling immigrants. His argument is a well 
trod argument in regards to drug prohibition in the United States as well.
8
 
Many of the aforementioned arguments regarding Prohibition were themes that 
reappear in scholarship pertaining to narcotics and marijuana. According to many 
scholars in regards to narcotics, race played a key role in the legal changes regarding 
heroin, cocaine, and opium. Among those scholars is Diana L. Ahmad. In The Opium 
Debate and Chinese Exclusion Laws in the Nineteenth-Century American West Ahmad 
argued that anti-Chinese sentiment fueled the push for the ban of opium in the United 
States.
9
 She felt that anti-Chinese attitudes were pervasive throughout the American West 
in both cities and small towns. Ahmad argued that opium was an easy target for those 
                                                          
7
 Thomas R. Pegram, Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800-1933 (Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee, 1998). 
8
 Greenberg, Prohibition Enforcement. 
9
 Diana L. Ahmad, The Opium Debate and Chinese Exclusion Laws in the Nineteenth-Century American 
West (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007). 
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who wanted rid of Chinese immigrants as it was perceived by the majority of Americans 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a Chinese habit. She concluded that 
forces conspired to control the opium trade within U.S. borders by restricting Chinese 
immigration.  
In Unequal Under Law: Race in the War on Drugs Doris Marie Provine argued 
that racism in American society had a significant role in “the development of punitive 
attitudes toward drug use and in maintaining support for harsh criminal controls.”10 She 
argued that “moral entrepreneurs inside and outside government have played up the 
dangers of drugs for at least a century tapping American racism to amplify their 
message.”11 Provine agreed with Ahmad regarding anti-Chinese sentiment as a key 
element in the banning of opium in the U.S. She also asserted that cocaine was linked to 
racist sentiments towards blacks and marijuana was linked to racist sentiments towards 
Mexican immigrants. I agree with both Ahmad and Provine and will discuss the link 
between racism and marijuana in further chapters.  
In Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World David T. 
Courtwright acknowledged the role race played in stigmatizing or making substances 
illegal, but that was not the focus of his argument. He questioned how drugs such as 
tobacco, caffeine, alcohol, opium, cannabis, and cocaine were able to become part of 
global commerce.
12
 He argued that in order to achieve this status drugs had to attract the 
attention of Europeans for use as a trade commodity, a medicine, or a recreational drug. 
These six substances were the most successful in achieving this status in the global 
                                                          
10
 Doris Marie Provine, Unequal Under Law: Race in the War on Drugs (IL:University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 164. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 David T. Courtwright, Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World 
(Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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marketplace. Courtwright classified opium, cocaine, and cannabis as the “little three” 
drugs in the global black-market and argued that these three substances are what the 
majority of individuals conceptualize when thinking of “drugs.”13 Courtwright ultimately 
argued that these “little three” should remain illegal. Among scholars of the War on 
Drugs, most seem to argue for legalization especially among scholars writing about 
cannabis, but Courtwright differs in this regard. 
A very hotly debated topic in the historiography of drug prohibition in the United 
States is the prohibition of marijuana. Scholars of cannabis prohibition debate a variety of 
issues especially surrounding the impetus behind anti-marijuana legislation including: the 
involvement of race, the involvement of Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, and the involvement of media. In “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana” 
historian Michael Schaller looked at the legal treatment of Cannabis sativa through the 
lens of federal legislation as moral reform. He believed it, like Prohibition, was an 
example of moral reform. He also alleged in this political history that it “show[ed] the 
great power self-appointed government ‘experts,’” specifically the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, “. . . wield[ed] in shaping social legislation without regard to objective 
criteria.”14 
In “The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal 
History of American Marijuana Prohibition” law professors Richard J. Bonnie and 
Charles H. Whitebread II, detailed the various roots of the war against cannabis.
15
 This 
massive article was a sociopolitical history, which not only discussed the legal steps 
                                                          
13
 Ibid., 31. 
14
 Michael Schaller, “The Federal Prohibition of Marihuana,” Journal of Social History 4, no.1 (1970):61. 
15
 Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, “The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An 
Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition,” Virginia Law Review 56, no. 6 
(October 1970): 971-1203. 
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towards marijuana prohibition, but also illuminated the connection race played in 
marijuana prohibition. The inclusion of race is quite notable as many scholars openly 
dismiss the role bigotry towards Mexicans and blacks played in making marijuana illegal. 
“The History of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937,” written by David F. Musto in 
1972 is a pretty standard political history, viewing the creation of the Marihuana Tax Act 
from a top-down perspective, focusing on the law and the elites who created and enforced 
it. It provided a history of what led to the famous Tax Act. He attempted to illustrate that 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and its commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, were not solely 
responsible for the creation of the Marihuana Tax Act.
16
 This belief was not widely 
shared by other scholars of marijuana prohibition in the United States. 
The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United 
States (1974) by Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II studied “the American 
public policy response to marihuana.”17 This groundbreaking work detailed the creation 
of narcotics control in America and the demonization of marijuana. This book was the 
first complete history of marijuana use and its prohibition. According to Bonnie and 
Whitebread the passage of the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act condemned marijuana without a 
trial. The authors were careful not to make Harry J. Anslinger, the head of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the sole actor in the formation of the Tax Act and its 
implementation. This careful attitude makes the work noteworthy and, in part, echoes the 
work of David Musto in his article “History of the Marijuana Tax Act.”  
                                                          
16
 David F. Musto. “History of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.” Reprinted from the Archives of General  
Psychiatry 26, no. 2 (1972): 419. May 11, 2010. http://www.mikuriya.com/s6_1.pdf 
17
 Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitebread II, The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana 
Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974), 1.  
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In The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs 
Douglas Valentine details the history of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. In regards to 
cannabis Valentine argued that Anslinger’s “Reefer Madness” campaign was a necessity 
to save the agency and his job during the Depression. He contended that Anslinger 
borrowed from the advertising world of Madison Avenue and created “a need that could 
never be fulfilled” by launching the crusade against marijuana.18 According to Valentine, 
Anslinger relied on press contacts, the pharmaceutical industry, and the Christian 
evangelical movement to help him vilify a “rogue’s gallery of undesirable minorities that 
appealed to traditional race and class prejudices” as marijuana users.19 The Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics was integral in the push for anti-marijuana legislation especially the 
Marihuana Tax Act.  
Another work that dealt with the influence and activities of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics was “The Marihuana Tax Act” by Howard S. Becker. Agreeing with 
Valentine’s assertions, he also argued that the FBN played a prominent role in the 
passage of the Tax Act. Becker asserted the FBN used a two-pronged attack by 
advocating state laws outlawing marijuana as well as instituting an educational campaign 
about marijuana’s supposed evils.20  
Marijuana Use and Criminal Sanctions, published by Richard J. Bonnie in 1980, 
traced the evolution of marijuana prohibition. He divided marijuana prohibition into five 
phases: regional and local prohibition (1915-1931), nationalization (1932-1937), 
dormancy after prohibition was achieved (1938-1951), escalation when marijuana was 
                                                          
18
 Douglas Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf: The Secret History of America’s War on Drugs (NY:Verso, 
2004), 21. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Howard S. Becker, “The Marihuana Tax Act,” Paul E. Rock, ed. Drugs and Politics (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Books, 1977), 55-66. 
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viewed as a stepping stone to harder drugs (1951-1965), and penalty reduction (1965-
1972). This same division of marijuana prohibition can be found in Bonnie and 
Whitebread’s previous work The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marihuana 
Prohibition in the United States.
21
  
Rhetoric in the War on Drugs: Triumphs and Tragedies of Public Relations by 
William N. Elwood analyzed the anti-drug rhetoric of President Ronald Reagan and 
President George H.W. Bush.
22
 He focused on presidential declarations of a War on 
Drugs as well as other anti-drug speeches. This book is very relevant to my thesis, but 
there are aspects that separate our studies. I will focus on public service announcements 
from the Advertising Council; whereas Elwood studied public service announcement 
from the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. The Advertising Council’s ads were 
federally funded, while the Partnership for a Drug-Free America’s ads were privately 
funded.  
A final issue debated in the historiography of marijuana prohibition is whether 
marijuana is truly a gateway drug and where this perception came from. In The American 
Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control David F. Musto, a Yale University historian, 
illuminated cannabis’s historical relationship with cocaine and heroin. As Musto pointed 
out anti-marijuana propaganda often falsely linked marijuana users with cocaine and 
heroin use, leading to the belief that marijuana is a gateway drug.
23
 Valentine also 
asserted that anti-marijuana propaganda created the image of marijuana as a stepping 
                                                          
21
 Richard J. Bonnie, Marijuana Use and Criminal Sanctions: Essays on the Theory and Practice of
 Decriminalization (Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company, 1980). 
22
 William N. Elwood, Rhetoric in the War on Drugs: The Triumphs and Tragedies of Public Relations 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). 
23
 David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control, 3
rd
 ed. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
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stone to harder drugs such as heroin. Valentine pointed the finger directly at Harry J. 
Anslinger for the creation and purposeful propagation of this belief.
24
 
Most academic analyses of the American War on Drugs discuss the failings of 
domestic drug policy. My analysis will not judge the success or failure of drug policy, but 
rather explain why an anti-marijuana campaign was important to the federal government 
and delve into the government’s motivations and methodology. In order to understand the 
battle over the meaning of cannabis, one must discuss the evolution of its relationship 
with mankind, and the “weapons of combat.” The American drug war evolved 
significantly from 1937 to the 1980s as did the “weapons” the government used. Laws 
are its most visible expression, but censorship, fear-mongering, and propaganda play 
major roles, as well. The push-pull between agents of the federal government and 
portions of the American populace over the right to define cannabis played a significant 
role in the drug war. This battle was fought through various forms of popular culture, an 
analysis of which would be a highly valuable contribution to drug war scholarship. 
Unlike existing scholarship, which rarely mentions cultural expressions of the War on 
Drugs, my research will delve into the anti-drug media campaign and drug war culture 
more fully. When did the federally-funded anti-drug media campaign emerge? Why? 
Why did much of the campaign focus on marijuana instead of a generalized anti-drug 
media campaign? I want to reveal why and how cannabis went from being viewed as the 
hemp plant to marijuana and why the federal government wants to keep it that way. 
In the following chapters I will examine various aspects of marijuana’s 
relationship with the federal government. Chapter One is a chronological history of 
cannabis in the United States from colonial era to 1937, illustrating that the cultural 
                                                          
24
 Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 21. 
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definition of cannabis was hemp prior to 1937. A discussion of the beginning of the War 
on Drugs with the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 will significantly add to the 
reader’s understanding of roots of the war and its eventual focus on cannabis. Of 
particular note will be a discussion of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.  
In Chapter Two I will focus on marijuana in the late 1930s through the 1950s. In 
an attempt to illuminate the complex and sometimes contradictory relationship the federal 
government had with marijuana, I will discuss Reefer Madness, Hemp for Victory, and 
anti-drug pulp fiction. In continuing to provide the reader with a chronology of 
marijuana’s history in the United States, I will discuss the LaGuardia Report of 1944 and 
the Boggs Act of 1951, both key events in the War on Drugs. 
In Chapter Three I will focus on marijuana in the 1960s through the 1970s. I will 
discuss the continued government campaign against marijuana, paying particular 
attention to presidential participation in the War on Drugs. Of particular note will be a 
discussion of Leary v. United States and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970, both key events, which dramatically affected the legal status of 
marijuana. 
In Chapter Four I will focus particularly on marijuana in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
I will examine the multi-state decriminalization of marijuana as well as Jimmy Carter’s 
push for federal decriminalization. In the 1980s I will analyze the founding of a federally-
funded anti-drug media campaign, Just Say No, and the Reagan era’s impact on the status 
of cannabis in American society. I will include a discussion of the government’s 
successes regarding its definition of cannabis.  
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Chapter One: From Hemp to Marijuana 
“Of all the plants men have ever grown, none has been praised and denounced as 
often as” Cannabis sativa. This hardy plant is “an adaptive and highly successful annual 
found growing throughout the temperate and tropical zones of the world,” which can be 
cultivated for hemp, seed, or marijuana.
25
 Hemp comes from the fibrous stalk of the plant 
and can be made into rope, twine, carpet thread, yarn, sail cloth, oakum, oil, canvas, 
linen, and paper.
26
 Cannabis seeds can yield a valuable, quick drying oil and can be used 
as sustenance for birds.
27
 Marijuana is an intoxicant, which comes from the cultivation of 
the resinous buds or flowers of the cannabis plant. The dual nature of this plant led to its 
complex relationship with mankind and with Americans specifically.  
To a contemporary American this fact may seem extraordinary, but the hemp crop 
was an established part of the American agrarian landscape well before the birth of this 
nation.
28
 In fact, George Washington was a hemp farmer. While Cannabis sativa has 
deep roots in American history, the plant has undergone a dramatic ideological 
transformation since Washington first sowed hemp seeds in 1766 in his fertile Virginian 
fields.
29
 Cannabis sativa was once a common and desirable crop in the North America. In 
1781 Thomas Jefferson referred to hemp as a “staple commodity;” 30 yet less than two 
hundred years later it was officially a “forbidden” plant.31 
                                                          
25
 Martin Booth, Cannabis: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 1. 
26
 John H. Garland, “Hemp: A Minor American Fiber Crop,” Economic Geography 22, no. 2 (April 1946): 
126.  
27
 Bonnie and Whitebread , The Marihuana Conviction, 1. 
28
 Michael Pollan, The Botany of Desire: A Plant’s Eye View of the World (New York: Random House 
Trade Paperbacks, 2002), 131. 
29
 George Washington, “Sowing and Harvesting,” The Diaries of George Washington. vol. 2, ed. Donald 
Jackson (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 1. 
30
 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Boston, MA: Lilly and Wait, 1832), 39.  
31 Marihuana Tax Act, Public Law 238, 75th Congress, Session 1 (August 2, 1937). 
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What caused this transformation? At the heart of it was a struggle between 
members of the American public and agents of the federal government to define 
Cannabis sativa in their own terms. In the case of cannabis, a significant portion of the 
American public held deeply rooted beliefs about the uses and value of that plant, which 
will be illustrated throughout this chapter. In the early twentieth century the federal 
government challenged those longstanding views with the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 
which legally reclassified cannabis as an “illegal” drug and failed to make any true 
distinction between cultivating hemp and growing marijuana.
32
 Did this legal 
transformation alter traditional American views of the plant? What means did the 
government use to reinforce its definition of cannabis and why? Before one can explore 
the answers to these questions one must understand the genesis of the traditional 
definition of cannabis as well as the origin of the “new” definition. To understand what a 
radical departure it was one must first illuminate the “new” definition against the greater 
historical backdrop of humanity’s relationship with Cannabis sativa Linne. 
 
A Brief Global History 
The emergence of hemp farming in the United States was not spontaneous; rather 
it was a result of man’s longstanding relationship with Cannabis sativa Linne. 
Humanity’s complex co-evolutionary relationship with cannabis began over 10,000 years 
ago, making it one of the first domesticated plants.
33
 The first recorded human contact 
with cannabis occurred in ancient China on the island of Taiwan.
34
 Man subsequently 
spread cannabis across the planet from Asia to Africa, then to South America, Europe (by 
                                                          
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Pollan, The Botany of Desire, 157. 
34
 Michael Pollan. “Cannabis Forgetting and the Botany of Desire,” February 7, 2008 
http://www.youtube.com/watch/v=QeCra-sn0dI 
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500 A.D.), and North America.
35
 For centuries preceding the colonization of the Western 
hemisphere, Cannabis sativa was a common crop in Europe and Africa.  
Throughout the history of mankind’s relationship with cannabis, people cultivated 
this plant for a wide variety of reasons including: as paper, cloth, rope, as an intoxicant 
(Indian hashish), and as medicine. In China, Africa, and the Middle East many of the 
earliest documents appeared on hemp paper. In fact “up until the last century, hemp was 
one of humankind’s only sources of paper and cloth.”36 The stalk of the hemp plant was 
also renowned for its fibers, which could be woven into some of the strongest rope man 
ever used.
37
 In 1533 due to the British navy’s need for cordage and canvas, King Henry 
VIII demanded that “for every sixty acres of arable land a farmer owned; a quarter acre 
was to be sown with hemp.”38 For centuries, cultures in Asia associated cannabis with 
intoxication, but this “forbidden” knowledge was uncommon in the Western world, 
especially in North America prior to the twentieth century. Before the sixteenth century, 
people in the Western world commonly used cannabis based folk remedies.
39
 Midwives, 
healers, and witches used cannabis to treat a wide variety of ailments including: 
alcohol withdrawal, anthrax, asthma, blood poisoning, bronchitis, burns, 
[the pain of] childbirth, convulsions, coughs, cystitis, delirium, depression, 
diarrhea, dysentery, dysmenorrhea, epilepsy, fever, gout, inflammation, 
insomnia, jaundice, lockjaw, malaria, mania, mennorhagia, migraine, 
morphine withdrawal, neuralgia, palsy, rheumatism, scalds, snakebites, 
swellings, tetany, toothache, uteral prolapse, and whooping cough.
40
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 “Marijuana,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, April 25, 2010. 
http://search.edb.com/ebc/article-9371320 
36
 Pollan, The Botany of Desire, 157. 
17 Ibid., 128-131. 
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 Abel, Marihuana, 73.   
39
 Pollan, The Botany of Desire, 174. 
40
 James A. Duke. Handbook of Energy Crops, May 11, 2010. 
http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/duke_energy/Cannabis_sativa.html#Folk Medicine 
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As the study of medicine as a science emerged in the Western world, cannabis moved 
from folk remedy to scientifically embraced medicine. A “Swiss alchemist and physician 
named Paracelsus,” also known as the “father of medicine,” introduced plants like 
cannabis into the science of medicine.
41
 During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries cannabis was openly accepted by the European and American 
medical communities as a plant with many medicinal benefits. Well before the 
colonization of the Americas, cannabis had a lengthy and relatively positive relationship 
with mankind. 
In the 1600s British colonists brought domesticated Cannabis sativa seeds to 
North America as the New World provided fertile land on which to grow hemp. 
However, the colonists were not the first to use cannabis in these “new” lands. In the 
seventeenth century colonists encountered many Native American tribes who utilized 
wild hemp for fiber and medicine, among them the Tuscarora Indians.
42
 In fact “their 
name derives from an Iroquoian term for ‘hemp gatherers.’”43 Historically, “in the 
subsistence agriculture of much of early America” Euro-Americans cultivated Cannabis 
sativa for agricultural purposes, specifically for its fiber and seed.
44
 Although primarily 
grown for cordage from the 1630s to the 1800s, hemp was accepted as legal tender even 
for taxation.
45
 On August 16, 1619, the first colonial legislative assembly in Jamestown, 
Virginia, enacted legal measures to guarantee the agricultural success of the colony. The 
colonists’ discourse regarding hemp and flax led the assembly to proclaim that “we do 
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require and enjoine all householders of this Colony [to] make a trial thereof the nexte 
season,” thus legally mandating the cultivation of cannabis.46 To the citizens of 
Jamestown the cultivation of hemp was not merely an acceptable agricultural endeavor; it 
was their civic duty. 
As colonists fanned out across the North American continent, so too did the 
practice of cultivating cannabis. “From Virginia and Pennsylvania, the industry had 
spread from Kentucky by 1775 and from there to Missouri by 1835.”47 On a lesser scale, 
hemp was also farmed in the late nineteenth century in California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
and Nebraska. On the other hand, cultivation of the cannabis plant for its seeds, 
specifically for hemp seed oil, was centered, for the most part, “in the Kentucky and 
Illinois River valleys.”48  
In 1777 the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia extolled the virtues of 
Cannabis sativa as “one of the most profitable productions the earth furnishes in northern 
climates” and “worthy of the serious attention . . . of the northern colonies, of every 
trading man, and of every man, who truly loves his country.”49 In 1789 the Society, 
whose membership included such famous American patriots as (founding member) 
Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Thomas 
Jefferson, and George Washington, published a pamphlet regarding the proper techniques 
to guarantee an abundant hemp crop.
50
 This publication provided valuable information to 
yeoman farmers and encouraged them to find fiduciary success with hemp cultivation. To 
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an American farmer prior to the early twentieth century, Cannabis sativa was hemp, an 
agricultural product meant for industrial use. 
Many notable political figures, among them George Washington and Thomas 
Jefferson, followed the advice promulgated by the American Philosophical Society and 
grew hemp. On March 22, 1766 George Washington wrote in his farming diary that he 
“began to sow Hemp (adjoining the Lane going to Mrs. Wades) at Mill . . . sowed as far 
as a stick drove into the Ground.”51 Washington grew fields of hemp on his farm Mount 
Vernon, while Jefferson grew it on his farm Monticello. Jefferson even invented a 
modified thresher, which could more efficiently harvest hemp.
52
 To America’s founding 
fathers, hemp was a normal part of the agrarian landscape. 
Benjamin Franklin used rag paper made of flax, hemp, or cotton cloth during his 
career as a printer.
53
 The founding fathers used hemp paper to draft the documents that 
created the United States. Whereas the official signed copies were on parchment paper, 
made from animal skin, Thomas Jefferson wrote the first four drafts of the Declaration of 
Independence on hemp paper, while James Madison wrote drafts of the U.S. Constitution 
on hemp paper as well.
54
 The American Congress itself had a long-lasting relationship 
with hemp. From the 1780s to the early 1900s, there are over one hundred accounts in the 
Congressional Record of legislators discussing hemp.
55
 In 1825 an excerpt from the 
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American Farmer Volume 5 was introduced into the Senate record describing hemp as 
follows: 
Hemp is a very hardy plant, resists drought and severe frost, is easier 
cultivated, less exhausting, and more profitable, than many other crops, 
with which this does not interfere in its cultivation, except the tobacco 
crop; it is sown before, and gathered after, corn, and requires no attention 
when wheat is sown, harvested, or thrashed. It will grow year after year on 
the same ground, on which it sufficiently rich, it is the surest crop. It is 
liable to no diseases and injured by no insects.
56
 
 
Lawmakers were primarily concerned with obtaining domestic and foreign hemp for use 
as cordage by the United States Navy. The Navy used hemp cordage from its inception 
and utilizes it to the present day, importing it from the Philippines. From the first 
Congress, year after year, legislators allotted funds to purchase hemp from American 
farmers and, in turn, actively encouraged farmers to grow more hemp each season.
57
 For 
example, in 1811 the House of Representatives advocated that farmers devote more land 
and effort to hemp, hoping to lessen the country’s dependence on foreign hemp and 
create a surplus so that the United States could become a major exporter.
58
 In 1825 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton from Missouri proposed a bill that the Navy use only 
American grown hemp.
59
 In February of 1843 the Committee of the Whole House 
discussed a bill to “provide for the purchase of water-rotted hemp for the use of the 
United States Navy” specifically from Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and 
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Tennessee.
60
 In 1863 the Senate provided twenty thousand dollars “for investigations to 
test the practicability of cultivating and preparing flax and hemp as a substitute for 
cotton.”61 Prior to the twentieth century, Congress actively encouraged a hemp-filled 
agrarian landscape. 
Although cordage was by far the most widespread use for hemp, Americans often 
used other cannabis products in their homes. Americans, like others in the Western world, 
used a variety of cannabis-based folk remedies.
62
 In the late nineteenth century, the 
American medical community openly embraced cannabis. Between 1840 and 1900, over 
one hundred articles appeared in American medical journals recommending cannabis 
use.
63
 In fact the United States Pharmacopeia included cannabis as a useful medication 
from 1850 to 1942.
64
 American doctors and druggists began producing cannabis based 
medications including tinctures, corn plasters, and medicines used on animals.
65
 The use 
of Cannabis sativa as medicine was a longstanding practice in America. It was in this 
capacity that the federal government first regulated cannabis under the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1906. This law required all medications that contained cannabis to list it as 
an ingredient on the bottle’s label.66 This law was intended to regulate patent medicines, 
not to eliminate cannabis-based medications. The view of cannabis as a drug had found 
acceptance in America, but this was initially a positive association not a negative one. 
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Prior to the twentieth century, Americans did not perceive cannabis as a recreational 
drug. Americans had long heard of hashish and its intoxicating qualities from their 
exposure to the cultures of India and Afghanistan and through literature such as the Count 
of Monte Cristo, but most failed to connect hashish with Cannabis sativa. 
Although cannabis was a widely used crop throughout America, it was never a 
major cash crop. Thousands of farmers grew hemp within the United States, but they 
produced no more than a fraction of the nation’s supply.67 By 1890 domestic hemp 
production was on the decline in America as more of the nation’s supply was imported 
especially from Russia and the Philippines. This was due to the fact that “hemp 
production was handicapped by its requirement of much highly skilled hand labor.”68 A 
skilled worker could separate roughly 250 pounds of fiber a day, but American farms 
could not compete with “cheap European and Asiatic labor.”69 Despite its decline hemp 
did leave a lasting mark on the land. “The hemp plant now grew wild against roadsides 
and in the fields of almost every state.”70 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
cannabis plant was “well rooted, and for the time being, largely ignored in America.”71  
The dominant American cultural definition of Cannabis sativa prior to the 
twentieth century was that of a plant with practical agricultural uses not a dangerous 
drug. Hemp farming was considered a patriotic and profitable endeavor, which was 
supported fully by the federal government. In the twentieth century, however, the federal 
government began to challenge Americans’ long-established relationship with cannabis.  
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Efforts to Redefine Cannabis 
Moral reform was a strong force in nineteenth century American life with every 
social ill attracting its own organized adversaries. As the nineteenth century progressed 
“and the institutional evils of industrialization and urbanization became apparent, this 
reform sentiment gradually turned to the government and the law to protect the moral 
fiber of the nation.”72 This reform sentiment promulgated the idea that “the moral 
strength of the individual was no longer . . . sufficient to counter corporate selfishness, 
political corruption, and urban degradation.”73 In the early twentieth century, the social 
reaction to drug use was informed by an “ideology that combined faith in the moral 
superiority of the dominant social order, confidence in the inevitability of moral (and 
therefore social) progress, preference for cultural homogeneity, intolerance of 
institutional ‘evils,’ paternalism toward children and immigrants, and faith in 
governmental action.”74 Federal and state policymaking in the early twentieth century 
was certainly affected by these pervasive attitudes. American lawmakers took heed of the 
shift of public opinion against intoxicants in particular. One of the first instances was in 
1905 when the New York legislature declared morphine, opium, and cocaine to be 
“poisons.” They were no longer to be sold without a warning label.75 According to 
historian David Musto, as a result of uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of 
“legislation enabling federal law to prevail in an area of morals” there was an 
insignificant amount of effort prior to 1900 to create a federal law in order “to control the 
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sale and prescription of narcotics.”76 With the success of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug 
Act, there came a movement within the pharmaceutical industry, which supported a 
regulatory anti-narcotic law. The Agricultural Department supported the efforts of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Both groups advocated using the interstate commerce clause of 
the Constitution to achieve such a law. In 1912 the U.S. State Department embarked upon 
its own campaign for an anti-narcotic law, advocating instead using the federal 
government’s revenue powers.77 In 1914 the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act marked the first 
federal legislation to regulate narcotics, specifically cocaine and opium. While the 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act had popular support, it was also met with many legal 
challenges as cannabis, cocaine, and opium had lengthy relationships with Americans. 
Cocaine was a very popular drug in the nineteenth century. It was used throughout 
the United States to treat, among other things, hay fever and to cure “opium, morphine, 
and alcohol habits.”78 It was frequently an ingredient in patent medicines, sodas, and 
wines. In the early twentieth century, state laws and local laws began to regulate cocaine 
use, but these laws were filled with loopholes. These laws were also ineffective since one 
state might enact an anti-cocaine law, but “bordering states without such laws often 
provided drugs for users and sellers.”79 Unlike cannabis, cocaine, a derivative of the coca 
plant, was not grown in the United States and therefore was solely imported for medicinal 
and recreational purposes. 
The nineteenth century marked an era of unprecedented increase in the use of 
opium in America. It was widely prescribed by physicians as a both a sedative and oddly 
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enough a stimulant, as well primarily to treat gastrointestinal illnesses.
 80
 Its recreational 
use marked the most disturbing trend to progressive activists though. The trend of 
smoking opium spread quickly in the United States, beginning with Chinese immigrants 
in San Francisco and spreading rapidly eastward.
81
 Prior to the Harrison Narcotics Tax 
Act, opium was regulated with heavy importation duties enacted by Congress.
82
 Unlike 
cannabis, opium was not grown commercially in any significant quantity in the United 
States, so virtually the entire national supply was imported. In 1909 smoking opium was 
banned from importation into the United States.
83
 
Some reformers and prohibitionists advocated the inclusion of cannabis, although 
“not even the reformers claimed, in the pre-World War I hearings and debates . . . that 
cannabis was a problem of any major significance in the United States.”84 One particular 
proponent was Dr. Hamilton Wright. He worked for the U.S. State Department assisting 
the anti-narcotic campaign. Dr. Wright felt that cannabis should be outlawed since the 
prohibition of cocaine and opiates would lead addicts straight to Cannabis sativa.
85
 
Wright believed “in a hydraulic model of drug appetites,” which meant that without 
medical treatment addicts would transfer their addiction to another intoxicant such as 
cannabis if they were legally unable to obtain narcotics.
86
 He felt that the anti-narcotic 
reformer’s main task “was to prohibit and control as many dangerous and seductive 
substances as possible at one time.”87 Wright’s ideas as well as ideas of other reformers 
did not succeed in getting Cannabis sativa added to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, but 
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they did succeed in helping to shape the mindset of future drug warriors such as Harry J. 
Anslinger, the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from 1930 to 1962.
88
 The 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act “also provided a strange model for the administration of 
narcotics laws which would significantly affect future developments.”89 The bill was 
“drafted as a tax law rather than an outright criminal statute.”90 Under this statue to 
lawfully “produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or 
give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations” one must 
register with the Internal Revenue Service and pay for a special tax stamp.
91
 The law 
barred private individuals from purchasing the tax stamps; only members of the medical 
community were permitted to purchase them. Thus the only legal way for members of the 
American public to obtain opium or cocaine was with the prescription of a doctor or 
dentist.
92
 Clearly the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act “embodied a strong ideological and 
moral antipathy to habitual drug use in general and to the nonmedical or ‘street’ use of 
the ‘narcotic’ drugs in particular.”93 With this law a consensus emerged: “the nonmedical 
use of ‘narcotics’ was a cancer which had to be removed entirely from the social 
organism.”94 The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was not unopposed, though. Its 
constitutionality was tested several times in the U.S. court system. In 1919 Webb v. 
United States resulted in the Supreme Court ruling that opium and cocaine could not be 
prescribed merely to maintain an addiction. This ruling condemned the narcotic addict to 
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a life of crime if he were to maintain his addiction.
 95
 The methodologies behind the 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act would have effects on the formulation of future drug laws, 
specifically the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was the 
first real volley in the War on Drugs. 
In 1922 Representative John F. Miller and Senator Wesley L. Jones, both of 
Washington, sponsored the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act. This particular drug 
law limited the importation of opium and cocaine to only quantities necessary to 
adequately cover the nation’s medical needs. Use of these substances now required a 
special license. The law was amended two years later to prohibit the importation of 
opium for the manufacture of heroin. The Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act also 
established the Federal Narcotics Control Board, the precursor to the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics.
96
 This act did not have an immediate impact on cannabis, but years later it 
would be utilized by drug warriors against the cannabis users.  
The political and moral climate in the United States further shifted with the 
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, which outlawed the sale or production 
of alcohol
97
 and the subsequent passage of the National Prohibition Act, otherwise known 
as the Volstead Act, which outlawed the possession of the substance except in instances 
where it was deemed an “authorized possession.”98 In the nineteenth century, millions of 
morally outraged and politically motivated Americans crusaded against alcohol, seeking 
to free the American family from the evils of alcohol, saloons, and alcoholism. However, 
this fervor against alcohol consumption was not an anomaly in American history. Public 
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drunkenness was regulated as early as the 1630s in America. For instance, in 1633 in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony citizen Robert Cole was required to wear a red “D” around his 
neck for a year due to his repeated public drunkenness. In 1762 the Society of Friends in 
Pennsylvania banned the use of “ardent spirits” within their societies.99 Around 1766 
Methodism appeared in the America colonies. With this religious movement came the 
commitment “to the provisions of the English discipline which . . . [was] against using, 
buying, and selling distilled liquors.”100 Dr. Benjamin Rush, a respected physician and a 
prominent figure in the creation and signing of the Declaration of Independence, is 
considered to be “the pioneer in the [first national] movement against the use of distilled 
liquors” in the United States.101 He was responsible for a document urging soldiers to 
abstain from distilled liquors while serving their country. This document was approved 
and circulated by the Continental Congress’ War Board, marking the first time the 
American government had in an official capacity recognized “an appeal against the use of 
distilled liquors.”102 In 1784 the Methodist Church officially declared the prohibition of 
“drunkenness, buying or selling spirituous liquors or drinking them unless in cases of 
extreme necessity.”103 Beginning in 1789 Congress levied taxes upon distilled and 
fermented liquors.
104
 As one can see there was long history of religious groups in 
America prohibiting alcohol use amongst themselves as well as a long legal history of the 
government taxing or regulating distilled liquors which predated the “modern” 
temperance movement. 
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The modern temperance movement was at its heart a grassroots movement. It had 
its roots in these early religious movements and attempts at governmental regulation. The 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the Anti-Saloon League were influenced by 
these religious movements, as well as early temperance societies such as the Total 
Abstinence Society and the Sober Society.
105
 Many of the important leaps forward in the 
early nineteenth century in the temperance movement were due to the Congregational 
church specifically through its many state associations and state and local organizations 
founded by its many ministers especially Dr. Lyman Beecher.
106
 According to historian 
Ernest H. Cherrington, the year 1826 was the beginning of real organization in the 
temperance movement in the United States. This marked the point where local societies 
began to merge, state societies were created, and the first national society, the American 
Temperance Society, was born.
107
 
“Aggressive campaigns” were “mounted in every state from 1851 to 1869, and 
again from 1880 to 1890.”108 After such impressive and successful campaigns, two 
territories and eleven states adopted a policy of alcohol prohibition. However, mere years 
later one by one states repealed such legislation.
109
 By 1903 only Kansas (1880), Maine 
(1884), and North Dakota (1889) were considered completely dry states.
110
 According to 
scholar Martin Alan Greenberg, leaders of the temperance movement blamed these 
actions on four factors: a massive influx of immigrants from Germany and Central 
Europe; a national preoccupation with the abolition movement and the Civil War; a study 
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by the Massachusetts legislature concluding that prohibition was an “an arbitrary 
infringement of individual rights;” and “the adoption of the first national revenue law that 
imposed a tax on the distillers and sellers of liquor and beer.”111 Temperance was a very 
popular and enduring movement, on the “cutting edge of social reform and was closely 
allied with the antislavery and women’s rights movements.”112 Supporters of the 
temperance movement such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the Anti-
Saloon League viewed “alcohol the way people today view heroin: as an inherently 
addicting substance.”113 They believed that moderate consumption of alcohol would lead 
to addiction. Many prohibitionists demonized alcohol by associating it with deviance, 
criminality, and immigrants. 
“Prohibition had met all the tests of proper democratic action: the test of time, the 
test of full discussion, [and] the test of decisive majority expression.”114 In Congress the 
Eighteenth Amendment had received the necessary two-thirds majority in order to send it 
to the states for ratification, forty-six of forty-eight states ratified it, and Congress 
overrode President Wilson’s veto of the Volstead Act.115 Prohibition marked a radical 
point in American history where the government challenged the right of Americans to 
have certain personal liberties such as the right to drink and “by legal action . . . had 
destroyed millions of dollars-worth of private property in the brewing and distilling 
industries without compensation.”116 
                                                          
111
 Greenberg, Prohibition Enforcement, 46. 
112
 Harry G. Levine and Craig Reinarman. “From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy
 for Drug Policy.” The Milbank Quarterly 69, No. 3 (1991): 462. 
113
 Ibid. 
114
 Paul A. Carter. “Prohibition and Democracy: The Noble Experiment Reassessed,” The Wisconsin 
Magazine of History Vol. 56, No. 3 (Spring 1973): 189. 
115
 Levine and Reinarman. “From Prohibition to Regulation,” 463. 
116
 S. J. Mennell, “Prohibition: A Sociological View,” Journal of American Studies 3, No. 2 (December
 1969): 162. 
30 
 
Despite the monumental efforts of the federal government and temperance 
activists, Prohibition was an acute failure. A large portion of the American public openly 
ignored the Eighteenth Amendment, despite legislators drafting this amendment “in 
response to the full operation of the public opinion process.”117 According to historian 
David E. Kyvig, a large portion of the adult American population abstained from alcohol 
during the Prohibition at least according to Gallup polls of the day. However, the legal 
reclassification was unable to change the views or behaviors of an equally significant 
portion of the American populace. This segment of the populace publicly flaunted their 
disobedience and helped to create a thriving black market.
118
 Speakeasies, moonshining, 
and “fashionable public drinking by women made a mockery of the law.”119 
The temperance movement succeeded in legally reclassifying alcohol, but failed 
to effectively dictate its meaning to the American public, that of a dangerous drug. 
Ultimately, the mere existence of that public policy--even in the form of 
criminal law--was not sufficient to convert a public antipathy toward the 
evils of commercial alcohol traffic into opposition to moderate use of 
alcohol.
120
 
 
Public opinion was a catalyst for the failure of Prohibition, but was not the only factor. 
Enforcement of the law was a major issue. Local police forces were left for the most part 
to deal with it on their own. The federal government had anticipated general compliance 
with Prohibition. The Prohibition Bureau was created within the Treasury Department to 
assist local and state police forces, but was initially only allotted for $6,750,000 for the 
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first year and a half of its operation, a modest sum for supposed national enforcement.
121
 
According to scholar S.J. Mennell “enforcement was effective only in those areas of the 
South and mid-West where it had the support of public opinion.”122 In states such as New 
York with large immigrant populations, public opinion was against Prohibition and 
therefore disobedience was high and enforcement poor. Enforcement also suffered 
because of corruption among local and federal authorities.
123
 Enforcement failures can 
also be attributed to agencies such as the Customs Bureau, the Coast Guard, and the 
Bureau of Prohibition failing to communicate effectively and cooperate with one another 
in enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment.
124
 Enforcement also suffered because of a lack 
of funds. In 1932 the budget of the Bureau of Prohibition fell short by five million dollars 
from their eighteen million dollar request.
125
 This fiduciary shortfall ultimately could 
have made a significant difference in the effectiveness of the Bureau’s enforcement 
efforts.
126
  
Regardless of what ultimately doomed Prohibition, the tide had turned, the Great 
Depression hit, and popular opinion wanted the Eighteenth Amendment repealed. In 1933 
the Twenty-first Amendment repealed alcohol prohibition, but members of the federal 
government neglected to heed the failures of Prohibition. For instance, according to 
scholar Martin Alan Greenberg, federal officials failed to learn from the methods used by 
rumrunners during Prohibition. Utilizing “transoceanic ship traffic, and transcontinental 
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small boat, plane, and automobile traffic” alcohol smugglers’ methods were adopted by 
drug smugglers.
127
 While the Eighteenth Amendment did not immediately affect the 
status of cannabis, Prohibition helped to shape the mindset of lawmakers and bureaucrats 
like the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act before it. It should be noted that Harry J. Anslinger, 
outspoken anti-marijuana advocate and founding head of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, was first an outspoken member of the Bureau of Prohibition.
128
 Prohibition 
also led to the birth of a large federal law enforcement presence the likes of which the 
American people had not known before.
129
  
There was a growing international movement at the Hague conference of 1911 to 
criminalize cannabis. This movement received support from Americans such as the 
aforementioned Dr. Hamilton Wright. The conference failed to garner mass support to 
actually criminalize cannabis, though.
130
 A small, but significant movement to 
criminalize marijuana continued in the national arena, but failed to achieve a national 
statute. It did, however, serve as an impetus for several state and local laws. In 1914 El 
Paso, Texas, passed the first anti-marijuana law in the United States. It outlawed the sale 
and possession of the drug within city limits.
131
 This occurred in El Paso, most likely due 
to the city’s proximity to Mexico and its high population of Mexican laborers, many of 
whom used marijuana recreationally. Various states in the West began to follow El 
Paso’s example. Many outlawed the possession of cannabis without a prescription. The 
first among these was California (1915). The Golden State was soon followed by Utah 
(1915), Wyoming (1915), Texas (1919), Iowa (1923), Nevada (1923), Oregon (1923), 
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Washington (1923), Arkansas (1923), and Nebraska (1927).
132
 Maine, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and New York also had anti-cannabis laws on the books by 1915. 
However in these states cannabis was not singled out for regulation, but treated as if it 
were a narcotic.
133
 These laws were, in many regards, the result of a grassroots movement 
against drugs in general and in some states against cannabis specifically. Many of those 
involved in the grassroots movement as with the temperance movement had a racist 
agenda, which will be discussed later in the chapter. A question remains though. Did 
members of the public in these states truly know what they had outlawed? The newspaper 
accounts of these laws “clearly show that the marihuana was relatively unknown, even in 
states with considerable Mexican populations.”134  
Until Cannabis sativa was included as an optional provision in the Uniform 
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932 and in the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, “there was no 
‘national’ public policy regarding the drug.”135 Lawmakers felt the Uniform Narcotic 
Drug Act was a necessary measure despite the existence of the Harrison Narcotics Tax 
Act. The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was a revenue producing measure, but failed to 
grant the states “authority to exercise police power in regard to seizure of drugs used in 
illicit trade, or in regard to punishment of those responsible.”136 The Uniform Narcotic 
Drug Act granted the states these powers. It also made it illegal for anyone to 
“manufacture, compound, mix, cultivate, grow, or by any other process, produce or 
prepare narcotic drugs [cocaine, opium, and cannabis] . . . without first having obtained a 
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license.”137 Licenses under this act could not be given to anyone who had violated “any 
law of the United States, or of any state, relating to opium, coca leaves or other narcotic 
drugs, or to any person who is a narcotic drug addict.”138 The Act contained no specific 
punishments for violating the law, but granted the states the ability to determine this for 
themselves.
139
 Adoption of this law did not go as smoothly as members of the federal 
government had hoped. In 1934, two years after the creation of the legislation, only six 
states had enacted the anti-narcotic law. The hopes of federal actors were renewed by the 
end of 1935 as twenty- nine states had implemented the Act.
140
 By 1937 thirty-five states 
had passed the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,
141
 although not all states adopted the optional 
cannabis provision of the Act.
142
 According to legal scholars, Richard J. Bonnie and 
Charles H. Whitebread II, except for in Missouri there was no public outcry for such 
legislation and little to no media attention regarding the passage of the Act. The bill was 
often buried “beneath more controversial bills in a busy legislative session.”143 In some 
states the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act of 1932 was passed late in the legislative session 
“along with [a] myriad [of] other ‘uncontroversial’ laws.”144 In considering the bill, no 
state conducted an independent study to uncover “the medical facts about marijuana—
they relied on information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics or a few lurid 
newspaper accounts.”145 Finally the vast majority of the public barely seemed to register 
the passage of the Act despite a concerted propaganda campaign by the Federal Bureau of 
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Narcotics.
146
 Harry J. Anslinger, with the help of the Hearst newspaper chain, the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the General 
Foundation of Women’s Clubs, and the World Narcotics Defense Association, launched a 
crusade to mobilize the states against the “killer weed,” marijuana.147 The anti-marijuana 
“publicity effort, though miniscule in the wider scheme of things, dominated public 
discussion of marihuana in the mid-1930s.”148 The media and eventually policymakers 
adopted the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ view of marijuana, utilizing the Bureau’s 
examples of marijuana-related violence and disregarding the information the Bureau 
chose to ignore. The result of this was an overwhelming consensus among those who 
conversed about the drug. This consensus defined marijuana as dangerous and as a 
menace.
149
 The myriad of effects it had on a user’s consciousness could lead to “a 
maniacal frenzy in which the user was likely to commit all kinds of unspeakable 
crimes.”150 Users of marijuana were also defined as Mexicans, blacks, bohemians, 
criminals, and youths.
151
 Ultimately, this crusade led to the creation of the first federal 
law to outlaw marijuana. 
The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the pinnacle of the federal government’s 
efforts to change the definition of Cannabis sativa. This federal law redefined cannabis as 
an illicit drug and subsequently failed to make any legal distinction between hemp 
farming and growing marijuana. It was not the first anti-marijuana bill proposed, though. 
In 1935 identical bills were introduced by Senator Carl Hatch and Congressman John 
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Dempsey, both of New Mexico. These proposed laws would “prohibit the shipment and 
transportation of marijuana in interstate and foreign commerce.”152 Neither bill made it 
past committee. In late January of 1937 Congressman Thomas C. Hennings of Missouri 
introduced another anti-marijuana bill. His proposal was to prohibit the “‘sale, 
possession, and transportation of cannabis except in compliance with regulations to be 
made by the commissioner on narcotics.’”153 This bill also never made it out of 
committee.  
The Marihuana Tax Act succeeded where others had failed. Introduced on the 
House floor on April 14, 1937, by Congressman and Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee Robert L. Doughton of North Carolina, H.R. 6385 was described as 
“an Act to impose an occupational excise tax upon certain dealers in marihuana, to 
impose a transfer tax upon certain dealings in marihuana, and to safeguard the revenue 
therefrom by registry and recording.”154 Doughton reintroduced the bill late on June 10, 
1937, after it had passed through the House Ways and Means Committee. The debate 
over the bill was delayed when Congressman Bertrand Snell of New York asked the 
Speaker to put off the little known bill for another time due to the late hour.
155
 When the 
bill was broached again on June 14, it was clear that little was known about it outside the 
Ways and Means Committee. Congressman Snell again spoke out questioning the content 
of the bill. He was answered by Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas and Congressman 
Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky. Rayburn said that “it has something to do with something 
                                                          
152
 McWilliams, The Protectors, 57. 
153
 Ibid., 67. 
154
 Representative Robert L. Doughton introducing H.R. 6385 before the House Ways and Means
 Committee, April 27, 1937. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means House of
 Representatives, 75
th
 Congress, 1
st
 session (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1937):
 1. 
155
 Bonnie and Whitebread, “The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge,” 1061. 
37 
 
that is called marihuana. I believe it is a narcotic of some kind.”156 Vinson added that 
“marihuana is the same as hashish.”157 Neither of these men connected marihuana with 
hemp and there was no further mention of it. The House was not presented with a 
detailed analysis of the bill, rather they heard from a member of the Ways and Means 
Committee “repeating uncritically lurid criminal acts Anslinger had attributed to 
marijuana users at the hearings.”158 A vote was taken after “less than two pages of 
debate” and “passed without a roll call.”159 When the bill returned with minor 
amendments from the Senate, the only question raised was whether the American 
Medical Association agreed with the Act. Yet again, Congressman Vinson spoke up and 
misrepresented the testimony from the AMA representative, saying that the AMA 
supported the bill and even calling the AMA representative Dr. Woodward by the wrong 
name.
160
 
Clearly, many of the congressmen had little knowledge of the bill and in fact had 
probably failed to even skim it. Regardless of whether the congressmen read the bill or 
not it was now law. What was this law passed with so little fuss? The Marihuana Tax Act 
stated that: 
Every person who imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, 
deals in, dispenses, prescribes, administers, or gives away marihuana shall 
within fifteen days after the effective date of this Act, or before engaging 
after the expiration of such fifteen-day period in any of the above 
mentioned activities, and thereafter, on or before July 1 of each year, pay 
the following special taxes respectively. . . 
161
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Firstly, those individuals or companies, who import, manufacture, or compound 
marihuana must pay a $24 yearly tax. Secondly those who produce marihuana must pay a 
$1 yearly tax. A producer includes anyone “who plants, cultivates, or in any way 
facilitates the natural growth of marihuana; or harvests and transfers or makes use of 
marihuana.”162 Thirdly, doctors, dentists, and veterinarians must pay a $1 per year tax as 
well as register the transfer of marihuana to their patients (breaking doctor-patient 
confidentiality).
163
 This stipulation was the death knell of legal cannabis medications in 
the United States as the vast majority of doctors were not willing to break doctor-patient 
confidentiality. 
What really was unusual about the bill was the definition of marihuana as well as 
the punishments for not complying with the Act. The bill defined marihuana as:  
all parts of the plant Cannabis Sativa L., whether growing or not; seeds 
thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every 
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of such 
plant its seeds or resin--but shall not include the mature stalks of such 
plant, the fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds 
of such plants, and any other compound manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted 
therefrom), fiber, oil, cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is 
incapable of germination.
164
  
 
The definition, at first glance, does not reveal intent to harm hemp production. 
But more thoughtful reading of the definition spells trouble for farmers. In order to grow 
hemp, farmers required seed, which under the Act fell into the category of marihuana. 
The plant when maturing also developed leaves and buds, which also fell under the Act’s 
definition of marihuana. Therefore hemp farmers could not escape being classified as 
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“producers” of marihuana under the Marihuana Tax Act. The “taboo on the drug plant, 
[had] needlessly doomed the fiber.”165  
For a supposed revenue act the Marihuana Tax Act had rather stiff penalties for 
disobeying it. Despite the relatively small amount of revenue this act was designed to 
generate, a person convicted of violating the law could be fined up to two thousand 
dollars and sentenced up to five years in prison.
166
 This punishment mirrored the 
punishment for disobeying the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, which was an act to 
regulate narcotics such as cocaine and opium.
167
 Surely hemp farmers who disobeyed the 
Marihuana Tax Act by growing hemp without paying the special tax under the bill did 
not belong in the same category as individuals who obtained narcotics illegally. 
Ultimately hemp farmers were lumped in with narcotic addicts as it became 
impossible for farmers, or anyone for that matter, to comply with the Marihuana Tax Act, 
to legally possess or grow cannabis. The Act made it the responsibility of the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue to provide “appropriate stamps to represent 
payment of transfer tax . . . and appropriate stamps for issuance of special tax payers” 
registering under the Act.
168
 The Treasury Department neglected to produce the necessary 
stamp, thus making it impossible for an American citizen to pay the dollar tax per ounce 
or the one hundred dollar transfer tax and, thus to legally cultivate or sell Cannabis 
sativa.  
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Despite the gravity of this law and its impact on America’s farmers, it passed with 
no real debate.
169
 This result was partially caused by the legislators neglecting to 
adequately inform American farmers and other interested parties of their intentions prior 
to the passage of the law as well as “cannabis confusion” on the part of many legislators 
as they failed to connect hemp and marijuana as originating from the same plant. The 
majority of the testimony was heard only by the House Ways and Means Committee and 
the Senate Finance Committee, not the full House or Senate. According to historian 
David Musto “in the tradition of federal departments, everyone from the Treasury 
Department who appeared for the Tax Act gave it full support, while those who might 
have had more moderate views remained in the background.”170 The key individual to 
testify before both committees was the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Commissioner Harry 
J. Anslinger. Anslinger described Cannabis sativa as a very dangerous drug. During the 
five brief days of testimony in front of the House Ways and Means Committee, he 
compared it to Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, claiming that “this 
drug is entirely the monster Hyde, the harmful effect of which cannot be measured.”171 
Anslinger claimed that “its use frequently leads to insanity.”172 He cited numerous 
accounts of violent crime associated with marijuana users, but most accounts were 
lacking in specifics. For instance Anslinger cited the story of a young Floridian. 
A young boy who had become addicted to marihuana cigarettes, in a fit of 
frenzy because, as he stated while under the marihuana influence, a 
number of people were trying to cut off his arms and legs, seized an axe 
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and killed his father, mother, two brothers and a sister, wiping out the 
entire family except himself.
173
 
 
The brutal tale though is lacking in detail. Where and when did this occur? What 
source did Anslinger get this story from? Most of the examples Anslinger included in his 
testimony are equally vague. Anslinger did read a letter into the record from the City 
Editor of the Alamosa Daily Courier, Floyd K. Baskette. The letter included specifics 
about an attempted rape, but one has to question the motives and truth of the content of 
the letter. Baskette clearly associated marijuana negatively with Mexicans.  
I wish I could show you what a small marihuana cigarette can do to one of 
our degenerate Spanish-speaking residents. That’s why our problem is so 
great; the greatest percentage of our population is composed of Spanish-
speaking persons, most of who are low mentally, because of social and 
racial conditions.
174
 
 
Despite including materials that were clearly racially biased and sketchy examples of 
violent crimes, the House Ways and Means Committee seemed to accept Anslinger’s 
testimony at face value.  
As anticipated, the Representatives accepted whatever the Treasury 
Department asserted. The only witness to appear in opposition to the 
administration’s proposal, AMA spokesman William C. Woodward, M.D., 
was barraged with hostile questions. One member of the committee even 
questioned whether the veteran of many legislative battles dating back to 
before the Harrison Act actually represented the AMA.
175
  
 
Dr. Woodward, one of the chief drafters of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,
176
 
questioned why despite being a relatively frequent visitor to the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics during the two years prior it was not until these hearings that he and the 
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American Medical Association became aware of the proposed Marihuana Tax Act. He 
also questioned why the bill was prepared in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics in secret for those two years.
177
 When addressing the committee, Dr. 
Woodward openly objected to the use of the term marihuana as “Cannabis is the correct 
term for describing the plant and its products [and] the term ‘marihuana’ is a mongrel 
word that has crept into this country over the Mexican border.”178 It “has no general 
meaning, except as it relates to the use of Cannabis preparations for smoking [and] it is 
not recognized in medicine.”179 He blamed this faulty terminology on the failure of 
Indian hempseed dealers to connect this particular bill with their trade until almost too 
late in the game. Dr. Woodward argued that “medicinal use of Cannabis has nothing to 
do with Cannabis or marihuana addiction.”180 He asserted that the House Ways and 
Means Committee itself had heard no testimony to support the belief in the “excessive 
use of the drug by any doctor or its excessive distribution by any pharmacist.”181 He felt 
the burden of the legislation was placed too heavily upon physicians and pharmacists. He 
asserted that medicinal use of cannabis had declined in America, however, he argued that 
the use of the drug being “prevented by a prohibitive tax, loses sight of the fact that future 
investigation may show that there are substantial medical uses for Cannabis.”182 By no 
means did Dr. Woodward favor recreational marijuana use though. He felt like many 
members of the House Ways and Means Committee and others who testified that “there 
is a certain amount of narcotic addiction of an objectionable nature.”183 He also suggested 
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that “the newspapers have called attention to it so prominently that there must be some 
grounds for their statements.”184  
Despite this sentiment, he did not support the Marihuana Tax Act and neither did 
the American Medical Association. Dr. Woodward expressed his concern about both the 
absence of credible primary evidence being presented to the committee members and 
their obvious reliance on lurid newspaper accounts. He inquired as to why the Public 
Health Service and the Children’s Bureau had not sent experts to address the committee, 
especially if was true that marihuana had extremely negative psychological effects and 
was a public menace particularly among America’s youth.185 He was also concerned that 
the Bureau of Prisons and the Treasury Department’s Division of Mental Hygiene had 
not been consulted. Further, Dr. Woodward expressed concern about whether this entire 
matter should even be under the purview of the federal government and not individual 
state governments. He pointed out that this proposed law would attempt to “bring within 
its scope everyone who produces, wittingly or unwittingly, a particle of Cannabis.”186 
Under the definition of producer in the bill “every potential owner of land in the United 
States is a potential and maybe an unwitting producer of marihuana” as “marihuana 
grows wild along railroad tracks, along highways, on land belonging to the Federal 
Government, on land belonging to the States, on immense farms and ranches, forest land 
and place of that sort.”187 He asserted that “the Federal Government could never 
determine where this plant was growing,” “could never undertake to prosecute, and if it 
did prosecute it would meet with the same difficulty that it met in prosecuting under the 
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National Prohibition Act: the inadequacy of courts and the inadequacy of prosecuting 
attorneys, and . . . the inadequacy of jails.”188 
Dr. Woodward argued that the one recourse the federal government had was to 
educate America’s youth about the potential dangers of narcotics including cannabis. He 
asserted that the federal government had that power under an “old statute that requires the 
teaching of the effects of narcotic drugs in all common public schools, in the District of 
Columbia and all territories and places under the control of the Federal Government.”189 
He also suggested the inclusion of Cannabis sativa in an amendment to the Harrison 
Narcotics Tax Act: 
I beg, therefore, that if you decide that it is better to enact Federal 
legislation of this kind than to provide the Secretary of the Treasury with 
adequate means for procuring State cooperation in the enforcement of 
their own laws, and in enacting proper laws, ---I beg that you insist simply 
that so far as the medical profession is concerned these provisions be 
incorporated in the Harrison Narcotic Act.
190
 
 
All of Dr. Woodward’s arguments were summarily ignored by the House Ways and 
Means Committee. 
Besides testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, Dr. Woodward 
sent a letter in July of 1937 to Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi the Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Finance. The letter was placed into record of the Committee on 
Finance debate on the Marihuana Tax Act by Senator Prentiss M. Brown of Michigan. In 
the letter Dr. Woodward urged the Senators to not let the Marihuana Tax Act pass out of 
committee. As with his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, he 
asserted that the position of the American Medical Association would be to include 
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cannabis in an amendment to the Harrison Narcotic Tax Act if it was deemed necessary 
to have federal legislation on the matter. If not he asserted that the matter should be left 
up to the states.
191
  
The Senate Committee on Finance heard witness testimony similar to that of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, but it was clear these senators believed that the 
proposed bill would not harm the American hemp industry. The Treasury Department 
representatives, including Clinton M. Hester, the Assistant General Counsel of the 
Treasury Department, and Federal Bureau of Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. 
Anslinger, assured the Committee that the hemp industry in the United States would 
remain relatively unchanged. Hester stated that “the production and sale of hemp and its 
products for industrial purposes will not be adversely affected by this bill.”192 Under the 
bill’s “definition of ‘marihuana’ the hemp producer will pay a small occupational tax but 
his fiber products will be entirely exempt from the provisions of the bill, including the 
order form and transfer tax provisions.”193 According to Hester an American hemp 
farmer would only have to pay $5 a year to the Treasury Department regardless of the 
extent of his acreage. Hester asserted that the bill was not created to produce a prohibition 
on cannabis. 
The primary purpose of this legislation must be to raise revenue, because 
we are resorting to the taxing clause of the Constitution and the rule is that 
if on the face of the bill it appears to be a revenue bill, the courts will not 
inquire into any other motives that Congress may have had in enacting this 
legislation.
194
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When asked by Senator Brown from Michigan about the possibility of a prohibition, 
Hester replied in a manner foreshadowing the actual execution of the Marihuana Tax Act. 
In order to create a prohibition of marijuana “you would have to prohibit it entirely, and 
of course you would put all of these legitimate industries out of business.”195  
Harry J. Anslinger, commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, also 
testified to the safety of the American hemp industry. Farmers “are not only amply 
protected under this act, but they can go ahead and raise hemp just as they have always 
done.”196 When questioned by Senator Brown, Anslinger discussed the administration 
and collection of the tax. According to Anslinger a farmer “would go down to the 
collector of the internal revenue and put down his $5 and get a registration, a stamp tax,” 
permitting “him to grow under the act.”197 Like Hester one has to wonder if Anslinger 
had any foreknowledge of the true manner in which the Marihuana Tax Act was going to 
be executed. One cannot be absolutely sure, but a memo from 1936 points to Anslinger’s 
desire to eliminate the cultivation of cannabis in America and pacify legitimate industry 
by importing hemp or hemp seed.  
The State Department has tentatively agreed to this proposition, but before 
legal action is taken we shall have to dispose of certain phases of 
legitimate traffic; for instance, the drug trade still has a small medical need 
for marihuana, but has agreed to eliminate it entirely. The only place it is 
used extensively is by the Veterinarian, and we can satisfy them by 
importing their medical needs. 
 
We must also satisfy the canary bird seed trade, and the Sherwin-Williams 
Paint Company which uses hemp seed oil for drying purposes. We are 
now working with the Department of Commerce in finding substitutes for 
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the legitimate trade, and after that is accomplished, the path will be cleared 
for the treaties and for a Federal law.
198
 
 
Unlike the Eighteenth Amendment, the Marihuana Tax Act was not the result of 
overwhelming public outcry. According to historians Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. 
Whitebread II, “the public opinion process did not operate, and decision-makers 
remained uninformed about the drug.”199 The Marihuana Tax Act was the result of a 
concerted effort by the federal officials including the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to 
demonize the cannabis plant. There was no singular reason for this action. Greed, 
prejudice, paternalism, and racism contributed to the successful passage of this bill. Many 
forces conspired to determine the fate of the American cannabis plant. Prohibitionists and 
anti-narcotic advocates favored the illegality of Cannabis sativa. What is ironic is that 
during the early years of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, as seen in its annual reports, 
the agency felt the “marihuana problem” was minimal and should be handled by the 
states.
200
 The agency felt that much of the problem was magnified by “yellow 
journalism.” According the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
a great deal of public interest has been aroused by newspaper articles 
appearing from time to time on the evils of the abuse of marihuana, or 
Indian hemp, and more attention has been focused upon specific cases 
reported of the abuse of the drug than would otherwise have been the case. 
This publicity tends to magnify the extent of the evil and lends color to an 
inference that there is an alarming spread of the improper use of the drug, 
whereas the actual increase in such use may not have been inordinately 
large.
201
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Regardless of what other forces combined to make cannabis illegal, it is evident that it 
was ultimately the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which caused downfall of the American 
hemp industry. This is especially true because of the elimination of cannabis from the 
U.S. Pharmacopeia in 1941. Now medicinal use, which was allowed under the Marihuana 
Tax Act, was no longer even an option. 
The American public was not quick to eliminate hemp from the agrarian 
landscape. In order for the law to gain public acceptance from both citizens and 
lawmakers a campaign of negative associations was launched. Cannabis was first linked 
by Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to immigrants and 
criminality.
202
 The 1910 Mexican Revolution caused tens of thousands of Mexicans to 
cross over into the United States for a new life and better opportunities. These 
immigrants found relative acceptance and work on large ranches or with the railroads.
 203
 
During the 1920s and early 1930s Mexican immigration increased dramatically as 
migrant workers flocked to the southwestern United States in search of agricultural 
employment. Many brought with them the practice of smoking “marihuana,” Cannabis 
sativa. For many years Mexican migrants found employment in the orange groves and 
vineyards of California, working through harvest and with many returning to Mexico 
each winter. The Crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic collapse contributed to 
negative changes regarding the employment and acceptance of migrant laborers. The 
Dustbowl and Great Depression displaced thousands of tenant farmers from the Great 
Plains, flooding the American West with too many agricultural workers desperately 
seeking employment. Suddenly, Mexicans were outnumbered and unwanted. “Native 
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born” workers pushed for the repatriation of Mexicans and attempted to demonize them, 
especially “patriotic societies” such as the Key Men of America and the American 
Coalition. A portion of the American public succumbed to xenophobia, associating 
Mexicans with deviant, depraved, and criminal behavior.
204
 For instance, C.M. Goethe of 
the American Coalition in Sacramento, California, stated that: ‘marihuana, perhaps now 
the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted Mexican 
immigration.’205 To many Americans including Harry J. Anslinger, then the Assistant 
Commissioner of the Prohibition Bureau, the source of the Mexicans’ deviance and 
criminality was the “marihuana” many of them enjoyed after a long day in the fields. 
Connecting racist beliefs with criminality and marihuana, many Americans began to see 
Cannabis sativa as the “Mexican demon weed,” marihuana. 
Cannabis Confusion 
Since many Mexicans brought dried cannabis with them from Mexico, for the most part, 
Americans did not actively connect “marihuana” as part of the same plant which 
produced hemp. In fact, most Americans had never heard of “marihuana,” seen the dried 
buds, or knew a single individual who used it recreationally. Marijuana was virtually 
unrecognizable to the average American in the 1930s. Richard Bonnie and Charles 
Whitebread II contend that: 
Despite the increasing public interest in the narcotics problem during this 
period [1920-1937], we can find no evidence of public concern for, or 
understanding of, marijuana, even in those states that banned it along with 
opiates and cocaine. Observers in the middle and late 1930’s agreed that 
marijuana was at that time a very new phenomenon on the national 
scene.
206
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What little the average American knew about marijuana came from sporadic 
sensationalistic stories in newspapers, which did not connect hemp and marijuana.
207
 
These few, but lurid newspaper accounts helped contribute to the belief among middle 
class Americans that marijuana was a drug associated with Mexicans, “crime and the 
deviant life style in the Black ghettos.”208 Americans were so uneducated about 
marijuana that in New York the Federal Bureau of Narcotics felt it necessary to educate 
members of the New York City police department as to what marijuana looked like, so 
that they would be able to identify it on the streets.
209
  
“Cannabis confusion” was at the heart of the successful passage of the Marihuana 
Tax Act of 1937 as well as the lack of immediate outrage on the part of the American 
public.
210
 Most legislators failed to connect hemp and marijuana, dooming the fiber crop 
and forever changing the dominant cultural definition of cannabis in America from hemp 
to marijuana. The Treasury Department played upon this confusion and the minor 
hysteria it engendered in its failure to produce a tax stamp. How the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics specifically used manipulative media to further their goals and foster “cannabis 
confusion” will be discussed in the next chapter. 
When key legislators and federal officials more closely associated Cannabis 
sativa with marijuana, the rationales of drug reformers were able to find success in the 
federal government. Many federal officials such as Harry J. Anslinger assumed that 
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cannabis caused insanity, and criminal behaviors as well as acting as a stepping stone to 
other drugs such as heroin. They also assumed that public opinion had crystallized 
regarding the cannabis question and that it favored the “suppression of a drug with such 
evil effects.”211 The federal government succeeded in changing the legal and cultural 
definition of Cannabis sativa to that of marijuana not hemp. However, they did not fully 
succeed in altering the cultural definition from that of a plant with positive uses to that of 
a dangerous drug.  
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Chapter Two: Marijuana and Early Mass Media 
With the Marihuana Tax Act, the federal government launched the first successful 
volley in an aggressive campaign against Cannabis sativa. This campaign was supposed 
to change not only the legal definition of the plant, but the cultural one as well. As 
illustrated in Chapter One, the definition of cannabis in American society did change 
from hemp to marijuana as a result of the Marihuana Tax Act among other things; 
however, American society did not necessarily view marijuana as a dangerous drug. The 
true measure of this can be found in media representations of cannabis from the 1920s to 
the 1980s. The relationship between media and the cultural definition of Cannabis sativa 
has yet to be adequately explored. From the 1920s to the modern day cannabis has been 
the focus of much media attention. Books, magazines, songs, comics, movies, poetry, 
radio broadcasts, television programs, and public service announcements have either 
extolled the virtues of marijuana or demonized it. This push-pull between marijuana as a 
dangerous drug and marijuana as a positive plant highlights the fact that the American 
public has neither fully accepted the federal government’s definition of cannabis, nor its 
authority to control the definition of that plant. This chapter will focus on American 
media representations of cannabis from 1920s through the 1950s as well as including a 
discussion of the 1944 LaGuardia Report and the 1951 Boggs Act. The latter two were 
landmarks in the history of marijuana in the United States. The 1944 LaGuardia Report 
was a local government’s attempt to question the assumptions, conclusions, and policies 
of the federal government towards marijuana. The 1951 Boggs Act was a federal 
response to the perceived increase in marijuana use among Americans. 
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Marijuana: the Assassin of Youth? 
Prior to the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the national consciousness 
was not full of images of marijuana as a dangerous drug. In this era there was national 
media coverage of the “growing menace,” but these articles were few and far between. 
According to the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature from 1920 to August of 1937 
(when the Tax Act was passed) there were only seven articles relating to hashish or 
marijuana in nationally circulating magazines including: “From Opium to Hash Eesh” in 
the Scientific American (1921), “Our Home Hasheesh Crop” in The Literary Digest 
(1926), “Menace of Marihuana” in The American Mercury (1935), “Marihuana Menaces 
Youth” in the Scientific American (1936), “Facts and Fancies about Marihuana” in The 
Literary Digest (1936), “Uncle Sam Fights a New Drug Menace” in Popular Science 
(1936), and “Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” in The American Magazine (1937).212 
"From Opium to Hash Eesh" by Simon Carlton was featured in the Scientific 
American. This 1921 article dealt with narcotics addiction purported to be sweeping the 
nation. It primarily focused on the effects of the opium trade, but also noted that hashish 
(the resin of the cannabis plant) was gaining popularity in the United States. Carlton 
pointed out that throughout the nation the only law on the books which outlawed the drug 
was a 1914 New York City Sanitary Code law. Although he seemed to believe that opium 
was a greater problem in the United States, Carlton appeared to advocate for a federal law 
to control this new drug menace.
213
  
“Our Home Hasheesh Crop” featured in the “Science and Invention” section of 
The Literary Digest was anything but a dire warning against the cannabis plant. It 
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correctly made the connection between the hemp plant and hashish as well as pointing 
out that the plant was one of the most common weeds in the nation. The article cited the 
fact that “there is little danger that it [hashish use] will seriously promote the drug 
habit.”214 This was not just the opinion of the article’s author, but also the opinion of the 
government botanist who provided data to The Literary Digest.  
‘There is no reason to get excited about a sporadic outbreak of hashish 
addiction,’ Dr. D. W. Stockberger of the Bureau of Plant Industry stated to 
the Science Service. ‘Hemp has been cultivated as a fiber plant in 
Kentucky and other states for many years, and wild hemp is found in rich 
bottomlands all the way from the Atlantic Coast to the Western Plains. 
While these hemp plants are not rich in the resins from which hasheesh is 
made, they do produce at times at least a little of them, which the drug 
firms buy up to make into veterinary medicine. Yet tho [sic] they have 
ample opportunity, workers in the hemp fields have never become 
addicts.’ 
 
According to The Literary Digest, government plant scientists felt similarly about 
marijuana. 
 
‘Recent reports of the smuggling and use of the Mexican hemp derivative 
`marijuana' or `marihuana' were news to us’ Dr. Stockberger stated. ‘We 
have had correspondence with El Paso and other border cities in Texas for 
a good many years about this situation. The reported effects of the drug on 
Mexicans, making them want to `clean up the town,' do not jibe very well 
with the effects of cannabis, which so far as we have reports, simply 
causes temporary elation, followed by depression and heavy sleep. I 
suspect that the Mexican bravo doesn't take his marijuana straight, but 
mixes it with something else, possibly cocaine, or a couple of shots of 
mescal or bad whisky. That combination could easily bring on fighting 
madness.’215 
 
A decade later, marijuana, not hashish was the topic of discussion in the national 
media and the tone of articles began to change regarding the seriousness of marijuana 
use. “The Menace of Marihuana” featured in The American Mercury noted that marijuana 
use was rapidly increasing in the United States and connected that increase with both 
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Mexican immigrants and black jazz musicians. It argued that the low price of marijuana 
in comparison with the higher cost of other drugs such as cocaine, opium, and heroin was 
the major reason for such a rapid increase in the use of the drug by Americans. The 
article concluded by urging Congress to pass a law to prohibit the growth and sale of 
marijuana to stop the further spread of this growing public menace.
216
 
“Marihuana Menaces Youth” in the March 1936 issue of the Scientific American 
warned of the rapid increase in usage among Americans, claiming “that as many as one 
out of every four persons in some southern states are users.”217 The article detailed the 
supposed effects of marijuana use “including hilarity, swooning, and sexual excitement,” 
claiming that when it is “combined with intoxicants it often makes the smoker vicious, 
with a desire to fight and kill.”218 The article also seemed to advocate for the federal 
government to intercede to stamp out this particular drug menace. 
“Fact and Fancies about Marihuana” featured in The Literary Digest in October of 
1936 recalled the increase in marijuana use across the nation. The article also noted 
among Americans the aura of confusion surrounding the drug.  
From files of magazines, police records and books on drugs, lurid stories 
tell of the horror that is marihuana; others point out that it is not enslaving, 
as are other drugs; that in India it is considered a gift from the gods and 
has been used in religious ceremonies for centuries. The high degree of 
misinformation regarding marihuana has left the general public in 
ignorance; even among officials, there is confusion.
219
 
 
The article cited three facts, which it felt stood out in medical and social reports 
specifically that “marihuana is not a habit-forming drug, as is heroin or opium,” “it 
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prolongs sensations; it is in high favor as an aphrodisiac,” and “it is the most inexpensive 
of drugs; marihuana cigarettes usually selling at from three to twenty-five cents each.” It 
noted that the primary consumers of the drug are “Negroes, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, 
Spaniards, West Indians, [and] East Indians.” Unlike other contemporary articles, this 
particular piece did not blame marijuana for violent crimes. It claimed that there was 
none “of the yelling, dashing about, playing of crude jokes or physical violence that often 
accompany alcoholic parties; under the effects of marihuana, one has a dread of all these 
things.”220 There was no apparent outcry in this article for federal intercession to fix the 
problem of marijuana use in American society. 
“Uncle Sam Fights a New Drug Menace . . . Marihuana” appeared in Popular 
Science in May of 1936. It detailed the history of Cannabis sativa in America, noting that 
its use as marijuana was a recent development. The author, William Wolf, claimed that 
marijuana use had spread from the Mexican border across the United States. He asserted 
that after “another ten years of its phenomenal spread . . . the suppression of opium, 
heroin, cocaine, and similar drugs will seem like child’s play in comparison.”221 Wolf 
cited the infamous “Assassin myth,” which claimed an ancient band of Persian assassins 
murdered their victims while high on hashish. This is the supposed origin of the English 
word assassin.
222
 Wolf noted that authorities both local and federal were forced to utilize 
the only method of stopping the scourge that they had at their disposal--destroying “any 
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plants suspected as being used for narcotic purposes.”223 Wolf seemed to advocate for an 
educational campaign to combat public antipathy and ignorance of the new drug menace. 
Most of the aforementioned articles on marijuana contributed to “cannabis 
confusion” on the part of the American public, specifically confusion regarding the 
connection between hemp and marijuana and the perpetuation of misinformation about 
the plant. The notable exception was “Facts and Fancies about Marihuana,” in The 
Literary Digest, which actually mentioned the phenomenon of cannabis confusion. The 
other articles failed to make a connection between the hemp plant and marijuana. The 
connection may seem obvious, but to those who had never seen the plant or come across 
the drug the connection was anything but obvious. The articles associated this drug solely 
with minorities such as Mexicans and African-Americans. Most also connected the drug 
with the commission of violent crimes. This pseudo-scientific information regarding 
marijuana helped lead to the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and most 
definitely to the ignorance and lack of outrage on the part of the American public. 
Admittedly this was also partially due to the fact that few white Americans were using 
marijuana at the time, however, it was ultimately the failure of Americans to recognize 
that hemp was being condemned that allowed the Marijuana Tax Act to pass with little 
fuss and outcry. 
According to Richard J. Bonnie and Charles Whitebread II, much of this so-called 
publicity regarding marijuana could be directly attributed to the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger and his agency. Clearly the articles from the 
1920s cannot be attributed to the agency, but the Federal Bureau of Narcotics actively 
conducted a national educational campaign for federal legislation regarding marijuana 
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beginning in the 1930s. They sent stories to the press on the dangers of marijuana and 
even travelled around the nation distributing anti-marijuana propaganda.
224
 This is 
evidenced by the fact that Anslinger himself authored many anti-marijuana articles 
including among others: “Marihuana Research” featured in the Convention Book of 
Association of Medical Students (also appeared in the FBI Bulletin), “Regions of Sorrow” 
featured in Elks Magazine, “Relation of Narcotics to Crime” in the Indiana Police Chief, 
“Marihuana” featured in National Parent Teacher, and his infamous article entitled 
“Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” published in The American Magazine in July 1937 (a 
condensed version also appeared in the Reader’s Digest in 1938).  
“Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” was the only one of Anslinger’s articles to 
appear in a nationally circulated magazine. It portrayed marijuana as a killer of youths, 
which caused countless “murders, suicides, robberies, and [other] maniacal deeds . . . 
each year.”225 Anslinger urged individuals to become aware of its potential effects as they 
varied from user to user. He warned that “no one knows, when he smokes it, whether he 
will become a philosopher, a joyous reveler, a mad insensate, or a murderer.”226 He then 
revealed many “real accounts” of individuals causing havoc on the drug, committing 
crimes such as murder, going insane, or becoming sexually depraved. These accounts like 
those in his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee regarding the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, were very vague. For 
instance, Anslinger cited the crimes of seven addicts from Ohio, never mentioning names 
or a more specific location. He also recounted a history of marijuana use in the Western 
world. Anslinger cited use among ancient Greeks and Persians specifically among a 
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military and religious order known as the Assassins. He attributed the introduction of 
marijuana to the United States to Mexican immigrants with its use spreading North due to 
black jazz musicians. Anslinger worried about the influence of these two groups. He 
advocated for compulsory educational campaigns within every school nationwide and a 
federal law against the drug. 
The majority of the aforementioned articles from the 1930s sound starkly similar. 
This too lends credence to the assertion that the information contained in each article 
came from the same source, namely Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics. Anslinger himself confirmed much of this assertion in his 1961 book The 
Murderers: The Story of the Narcotic Gangs. In the chapter entitled “Hemp Around Their 
Necks” Anslinger provided details regarding the FBN’s national anti-marijuana 
campaign.  
On radio and at major forums, such as that presented annually by the New 
York Herald Tribune, I told the story of this evil weed of the fields and 
river beds and roadsides. I wrote articles for magazines; our agents gave 
hundreds of lectures to parents, educators, social and civic leaders. In 
network broadcasts I reported on the growing list of crimes, including 
murder and rape. I described the nature of marijuana and its close kinship 
with hashish. I continued to hammer the facts.
227
  
 
On October 23, 1937, Commissioner Anslinger addressed the nation on the 
Columbia Broadcasting Network, hammering the “facts” about marijuana. He asserted 
that the “Marihuana vice is being carried as a new habit to circles which heretofore have 
not been contaminated with drug addiction--the youth of our nation.” He portrayed 
marijuana as being linked to criminal activity, violence, and insanity. He regaled his 
readers with the story of the Assassins of Persia once again. Anslinger cited several 
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supposed marijuana crimes. Once again, he was extremely vague in his description of the 
crimes and cases of insanity, including no names, specific dates, or specific locations.  
For instance, he cited the story of “a fifteen-year old boy in another State” who “was 
found mentally deranged from smoking Marihuana cigarettes.”228 Despite his public 
assertions against scare tactics, he definitely indulged in them in his speeches. For 
instance, 
If hemp is consumed at very frequent intervals, the subject lives in a state 
of permanent stupor, interrupted by frequent periods of exaltation and 
well-being. These alternate with crises of melancholia accompanied by 
terrifying hallucinations which provide confirmation of his more or less 
delirious convictions. At this stage addicts become dangerous; they are 
intensely susceptible to suggestion; the simplest affirmation or the 
slightest obstacle arouses transports of fury, joy or jealousy, or menacing 
attitude. Eventually they have to be placed under restraint, as the result of 
some crime or any rate of acts of violence. 
 
Further, he asserted that “the fear of Marihuana must be hammered deeply into the hearts 
of our people, and the country must be galvanized into action to prevent the further 
spread of this new form of mental slavery—MARIHUANA SMOKING.”229 This 
nationally broadcast radio address contributed overtly to cannabis confusion as it never 
once mentioned the connection between hemp and marijuana, which is only made worse 
by the fact that speech came from a publicly viewed authority on drugs. 
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Harry J. Anslinger certainly contributed to 
the emergence of anti-marijuana media representations. However, the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics was not the only source of media from the 1920s through the 1950s regarding 
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marijuana. Many instances of marijuana related media from the same era can be found 
from both Mexicans and African-Americans. 
Marijuana in a Different Light 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, marijuana was a drug used by many 
Mexican immigrants. Historians such as Bonnie, Whitebread, and Musto among others 
agree that Mexican immigrants were responsible for bringing the practice of smoking the 
buds of the cannabis plant (marijuana) to the United States. These immigrants also 
brought references to the drug in the cultural expressions that came with them. It was 
even mentioned in popular Mexican folk songs like “La Cucaracha (1800s).” 
Spanish English 
La cucaracha, la cucaracha, The cockroach, the cockroach, 
Ya no puede caminar can't walk anymore 
Porque no tiene, porque le falta because it doesn't have, because it's lacking 
Marihuana pa' fumar. marijuana to smoke. 
. . . 
 
Un panadero fue a misa, 
no encontrando qué rezar, 
le pidió a la Virgen pura 
marihuana pa' fumar.
230
 
 
 
A baker went to Mass 
Not finding to pray 
He asked the Virgin pure, 
Marijuana to smoke. 
 
 
In the early decades of the twentieth century the Mexican immigrant communities 
were not the only place marijuana use could be found. Its use began to spread indirectly 
to predominantly black communities. It quickly spread into African-American culture, 
most notably via the emerging art form of jazz. In the early 1930s “reefer songs” were 
very fashionable within the jazz community. These songs included among others Louis 
Armstrong’s “Muggles” (1928), Cab Calloway’s “That Funny Reefer Man” (1933), Fats   
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Waller’s “Viper’s Drag” (1934), Willie Bryant’s “Viper’s Moan” (1935); and Benny 
Goodman’s songs “Texas Tea Party” (1935), “Smokin’ Reefers” (1935), “Mary Jane” 
(1935), “Mary Jane Polka” (1935), and “Sweet Marijuana Brown” (1935).231 Although 
Benny Goodman was a Caucasian musician, these songs were performed mostly by black 
musicians and written primarily for black audiences. Many of the songs were 
instrumental, having no lyrics at all, and thus never mentioned marijuana by name.  
In the 1933 W. C. Fields’ film International House starring Fields, George Burns, 
Gracie Allen, and Bela Lugosi, among others, jazz singer Cab Calloway performed the 
song “That Funny Reefer Man.” The lyrics are as follows:  
Man what’s the matter with that cat there? 
Must be full of reefer 
Full of reefer? 
Yea man 
You mean that cats high? 
Sailing 
Sailing 
Sailing lightly 
Get away from here 
Man is that the reefer man? 
That’s the reefer man 
I believe he’s losing his mind 
I think he’s lost his mind! 
Oh have you ever met that funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
Have you ever met that funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
If he said he swam to China, and he sell you South Carolina 
then you know you’re talkin’ to that reefer man 
 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
If he said he walks the ocean, any time he takes the notion 
then you know you’re talkin’ to reefer man. 
 
Have you ever met this funny reefer man?(Reefer man) 
oh baby, baby, baby, reefer man(Reefer man) 
If he trades you dimes for nickels  
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and calls watermelons pickles 
then you know you’re talkin’ to that reefer man 
 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
If he takes a sudden mania 
he'll want to give you Pennsylvania 
oh you know you’re talkin’ to the reefer man 
 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
Have you ever met funny reefer man? (Reefer man) 
If he said one sweet is funny 
because he won’t sell me Atlantic 
then you know you’re talkin’ to that reefer man232 
 
This popular and risqué movie and its show stopping performance of “That Funny 
Reefer Man” clearly took the genre of “reefer songs” outside the jazz community and into 
the realm of general American popular culture. But did white audiences really connect 
reefer with Cannabis sativa? Did they understand that hemp and reefer came from the 
same plant? Whereas, this song pokes fun at the antics of a man who smokes reefers, it 
never once mentions marijuana, cannabis, or hemp. During this era marijuana was 
increasingly familiar to jazz singers and performers, but whether an average American 
understood that marijuana or reefer was from the same plant as hemp was questionable. 
“That Funny Reefer Man” was quoted in “The Menace of Marihuana” by Albert Parry 
featured in The American Mercury, “Facts and Fancies about Marihuana” in The Literary 
Digest, and in Federal Bureau of Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger’s 
“Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” featured in both the American Magazine and Reader’s 
Digest. The potential influence of this song and “reefer songs” in general was very much 
a concern of the federal government and in particular Harry J. Anslinger. 
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In August 1938 Down Beat, a national musical periodical focusing primarily on 
jazz, issued a warning to its readership regarding the prominence of marijuana use by 
musicians and marijuana themed music. 
One of these days, say those close to the situation, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation will investigate the claim that the marijuana weed is 
promiscuously used and smoked by players of swing music.  
The idea that weed which is supposed to have first been taken hold of the 
low-down musicians playing in Harlem dives is now spreading to the 
bigger bands where instrumentalists now use it to emit the wild abandoned 
rhythms which comprise swing music is said to be arousing interest at J. 
Edgar Hoover's headquarters.  
Whether it is true or not, the FBI is convinced that there is a good deal to 
the rumors which they have heard and they are planning an investigation, 
allegedly, which may one day treat the U.S. to an expose which will rock 
the music world.
233
  
 
Down Beat’s portentous warning hit very close to the mark. Harry J. Anslinger, 
commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, had an intense dislike for jazz music 
and, in turn, jazz musicians. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics as well as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation kept close tabs on musicians who were reported to use marijuana. 
The FBN had a special file entitled “Marijuana and Musicians,” which included dossiers 
on, among others, Louis Armstrong, Cab Calloway, Count Basie, Les Brown, Jimmy 
Dorsey, Duke Ellington, Gene Krupa, and many band mates of the aforementioned 
men.
234
 Anslinger planned a nationwide roundup of these jazz musicians, but the idea 
was shot down by Anslinger’s superior, Under Secretary of the Treasury Foley.235 
Separately, however, both Louis Armstrong and Gene Krupa were arrested on marijuana 
charges by local law enforcement. In November 1930 Louis Armstrong was arrested for 
marijuana possession after a show in California while he was sharing a joint with Vic 
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Berton, a white drummer. After spending the night in jail, they were fined one thousand 
dollars each and sentenced to six months. The conviction did not stick though, as 
Armstrong’s manager sent a shady character named Johnny Collins to “fix the case.”236 
Afterward, Armstrong publicly declared that he would never smoke marijuana again, but 
this was considered to be extremely hilarious among jazz musicians. Armstrong was 
known as “a lifelong connoisseur of marijuana.”237 He even wrote President Eisenhower 
to ask for the drug to be legalized. He was also famously quoted as saying:  
It really puzzles me to see marijuana connected with narcotics dope and all 
of that stuff.  It is a thousand times better than whiskey. It is an assistant 
and a friend.
238
  
 
Gene Krupa, a famous percussionist, was arrested on January 19, 1943, for giving 
marijuana to a minor and was thus charged with contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor.
239
 He ended up being convicted of a misdemeanor and serving 90 days jail. He 
was also tried on a felony charge and convicted, but ultimately was released. Both of 
these cases ended in a better manner than they ultimately could have. They did serve as a 
warning to many that the law was watching the jazz community closely. However, this 
did not curb drug usage among musicians in the United States.  
Marijuana use was not limited to jazz musicians. Many in Hollywood openly 
indulged in “reefers.” These actors, including Jackie Gleason and Robert Mitchum 
among many others, were targets of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Hollywood was not 
really a target though until the 1940s. Even those associated with certain radio programs 
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were subject to suspicion and investigation by the FBN. Among those were the Coca-
Cola program, the Milton Berle program, and the Kate Smith program.
240
 Whereas, the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics was unable to secure cooperation of any in the jazz world or 
any major arrest, the agency did succeed in grabbing a noteworthy celebrity in 
Hollywood. Actor Robert Mitchum was arrested by the FBN in 1949 for marijuana 
possession and subsequently served a brief stint in jail.
241
  
Reefer Madness 
Not all popular media openly embraced marijuana. A noteworthy example of this 
is the 1936 film Reefer Madness. Formerly known as Tell Your Children, this film is a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of marijuana. The opening foreword claimed that the 
stories contained in the movie “are based upon actual research into the results of 
Marihuana addiction.”242 The movie opened on a Parents’ Association meeting at Truman 
High School presided over by fictional principal, Dr. Alfred Carroll. Sounding very much 
like Harry J. Anslinger, he urged the parents in attendance to join him in his effort to 
launch an educational campaign in order to stamp out the scourge of marijuana in their 
community. He further urged the need for a compulsory national educational campaign in 
schools about the dangers of marijuana as the only way to successfully rid the nation of 
this drug menace. Carroll then mentioned receiving a letter directly from the Department 
of Narcotics. Sending letters to parents’ associations resembles the tactics of the real 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the 1930s. This letter provided some basic information 
about the plant and its potential for abuse including some outright misinformation. The 
letter described the “dried leaves and berries” as being the parts of the plant which 
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contained the drug material. Cannabis sativa has no berries. This basic error makes one 
question if those who wrote the script for the film really did much if any research into 
marijuana. After reading the Department of Narcotics’ letter Dr. Carroll then recounted 
the story of teens who once attended Truman High School who were seduced by the evil 
drug, marijuana.  
This tale began with dope peddlers Mae and Jack targeting teens with their wild 
marijuana and jazz fueled parties. Innocent teens Mary, Jimmy, and Bill were introduced 
one by one to the drug scene by their mutual acquaintance Ralph, an older boy, who was 
already into reefer. First he took Jimmy to Mae’s apartment. Very quickly Jimmy was 
introduced to marijuana cigarettes. Everyone at this party behaved in an exaggerated 
manner. The party was filled with frantic jazz music played by one high teen with insane 
laughter plaguing many other teens. As the film progressed, another day dawned and yet 
another smoking party occurred with chaos quickly ensuing. Jimmy left the party to drive 
Jack to the older man’s dope supplier, smoking reefer while in the car. On the way back 
to the party, he drove like a maniac striking and killing a man, and fleeing the scene. 
Meanwhile, Bill left alone at the party tried reefer for the first time causing him to 
become a marijuana addict. His behavior drastically changed.  
In a cinematic aside, Dr. Carroll met with an agent at the local FBI office. The 
agent explained to him that there was very little the federal government can do as there 
were no laws on the books giving them power over the problem. The agent explained that 
federal government cannot use the Commerce clause of the Constitution because 
marijuana grows in almost every state, and thus there was almost no interstate commerce 
68 
 
in the plant. The agent asserted that a national educational campaign was the best option 
to rid the nation of this drug menace.  
The film then switched back to the smoking teens. At another party Bill ended up 
cheating on his girlfriend with a fellow partygoer Blanche. Meanwhile, Mary, the final 
innocent teen, found her way to Mae’s apartment, the den of iniquity. There she 
encountered Ralph who introduced her to reefer. While on the drug, Ralph attempted to 
sexually assault Mary. Bill, in a stupor, entered the room and attacked Ralph. Jack 
entered and his gun went off while attempting to break up the fight. Mary was shot and 
Bill was knocked unconscious. Jack placed the gun in Bill’s hand. When Bill woke and 
saw the gun and then Mary, he incorrectly assumed that her death was his fault. Bill went 
on trial and was found guilty. He was sentenced to hang. Driven mad by guilt and reefer, 
Ralph beat the older dealer to death. Mae was subsequently caught and the big drug boss 
was brought down by the feds. Blanche came forward and told the truth, however, the 
guilt overwhelmed her and she committed suicide by jumping out of the courthouse 
window. Bill’s conviction was overturned, but because the judge condemned his 
marijuana use he was forced to watch Ralph’s sentencing. The other young man was led 
into the courtroom in restraints with a demented look on his face. His trial was waived by 
the state. Deemed to be criminally insane because of his marijuana use, he was 
committed for the remainder of his life to an asylum. The overwhelming message of this 
film was that marijuana was a dangerous drug, which could cause you to become a sex-
crazed, murderous, and insane addict.  
This morality play extolled a message that Harry J. Anslinger wanted the public to 
embrace: that marijuana was indeed a “killer weed.” In fact his famous article, 
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“Marihuana: Assassin of Youth,” may have taken inspiration from the film. In the article 
he speaks of a girl who attended an evening smoking party with some friends where they 
experimented with marijuana. 
The results were weird. Some of the party went into paroxysms of 
laughter; others of mediocre musical ability became almost expert; the 
piano dinned constantly. Still others found themselves discussing weighty 
problems with remarkable clarity. The girl danced without fatigue 
throughout a night of inexplicable exhilaration.
243
 
 
This sounds remarkably like the smoking parties in Reefer Madness. Besides finding 
inspiration for his article in the film Anslinger might have found inspiration for his 
Congressional testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee regarding the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 in Reefer Madness. As mentioned in Chapter One, Anslinger 
cited the story of a young boy who killed his entire family with an axe while high on 
marijuana during his congressional testimony. This same story appears in the scene in 
Reefer Madness between Dr. Carroll and the government agent. The images in the film 
and its message had a lasting impact on both the mindset of the American public who 
embraced the government’s views of marijuana and the counterculture who embraced 
marijuana. The film was rediscovered by the counterculture in the late 1960s and early 
1970s and was used as a symbol of the absurdity of the federal policy regarding 
marijuana. 
Hemp for Victory 
Hemp for Victory, produced in 1942 by the United States Department of 
Agriculture, is an enigma. This film is a piece of government produced and federally 
funded propaganda promoting the “virtues” of hemp and the longstanding history 
Cannabis sativa has had with Americans. Its theme is diametrically opposed to the 
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messages extolled in the film Reefer Madness. One might question why the federal 
government, after taking such a hard stance on the cannabis plant, seemed to temporarily 
reverse its position. Simply put, war forced the American government’s hand. After 
banning the plant a mere five years earlier, the federal government found itself in a 
dilemma. Whereas, the government had made domestic production of hemp impossible 
by not producing the tax stamp required under the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the U.S. 
Navy had continued to utilize foreign hemp for cordage. In fact every battleship required 
roughly 34,000 feet of hemp rope. During World War II the Japanese invaded the 
Philippines and blocked Americans from trading with their Eastern allies, thus cutting off 
the United States’ major hemp supplies.244 The Department of Agriculture and the Navy 
pushed the Treasury Department to produce a tax stamp enabling American farmers to 
grow hemp for the war effort. At the end of September 1942 the Treasury Department 
finally complied. The War Production Board was able to approve the plans for American 
farmers to grow 300,000 acres of hemp, primarily in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin. It also made plans for building seventy-one processing plants 
in those areas.
245
 Once again, it was the patriotic duty of American farmers to grow 
hemp. In 1943 U.S. farmers were able to grow 36,000 acres of seed hemp.
246
  
The fourteen minute film Hemp for Victory was designed to encourage farmers to 
grow more hemp and to convince farmers who had not yet participated in this agricultural 
war effort to do their patriotic duty. The film began by regaling the use of hemp in 
ancient Greece and China. Then it connected hemp to the United States with images of 
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“Old Ironsides,” the U.S.S. Constitution, as well as settlers in Conestoga wagons crossing 
the prairies. The film detailed how to properly grow and harvest hemp. It also 
acknowledged hemp’s usefulness as “twine of various kinds for tying and upholsters 
work; rope for marine rigging and towing; for hayforks, derricks, and heavy duty tackle; 
light duty fire hose; thread for shoes for millions of American soldiers; and parachute 
webbing for our paratroopers.”247 It emphasized the need to register and receive a tax 
stamp to legally grow the plant, but never once mentioned its connection with the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. This piece of government propaganda openly contradicted 
the former enforcement policies behind the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. If the 
Philippines had not been overtaken by the Japanese then perhaps the government would 
never have openly acknowledged to Americans and specifically American farmers that 
hemp was still a vital crop in the United States. The tax stamps for growing hemp were 
only issued for a limited time by the Treasury Department.  
An article featured in Popular Science in 1943 estimated that 75,000 tons of hemp 
had been grown that year.
248
 That massive yield was an indirect result of Hemp for 
Victory and direct result of the Department of Agriculture’s campaign to get farmers to 
grow for the war effort. The film Hemp for Victory never connected marijuana with the 
hemp plant, but that does not mean that the Department of Agriculture was unaware of 
the potential use for this plant. The Department of Agriculture attempted to solve the 
problem of marijuana by breeding a “drugless” strain of the hemp plant. One might 
question why this was needed since “ditch weed” grew throughout the nation, but this 
strain of Cannabis sativa, which was basically wild hemp, did have nominal amounts of 
                                                          
247
 Hemp for Victory. 
248
 “Can We Grow Hemp Without Dope? Plant Wizards Fight Wartime Drug Peril,” Popular Science,
 (Sept.1943): 62.  
72 
 
THC. Dr. H.E. Warmke of the Carnegie Institute was enlisted by the federal agency to 
conduct experiments on hemp. He tested the strains on fish to determine the drug content 
of each plant.
249
 One can assume that they experiments never yielded a plant with 
absolutely no drug content as the growing of cannabis in the United States was once 
again banned in 1955.  
In the late 1940s and 1950s, “for the first time in our national history, there was 
public interest in narcotic drugs.” Bonnie and Whitebread attributed this to an increase in 
drug abuse in the late 1940s. Thus, the public was receptive to anti-marijuana propaganda 
promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
250
 During this era, anti-marijuana pulp 
fiction leapt off the shelves. With titles such as It Ain’t Hay (1946), I’ll Get Mine (1951), 
and Hooked (Narcotics: America’s Peril) (1953), these lurid books embraced the 
ideologies espoused by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. It Ain’t Hay was a mystery by 
David Dodge. It involved a marijuana smuggler as the antagonist. Whereas the 
protagonist in a plot of revenge descends into his own personal hell committing adultery 
and experimenting with the same drug he was attempting to stop his arch nemesis from 
smuggling into the nation.
251
 I’ll Get Mine was a novel by Thurston Scott about a woman 
and her descent into marijuana addiction.
252
 Hooked (Narcotics: America’s Peril) by Will 
Oursler and Laurence Dwight Smith was a novel in which girls prostituted themselves for 
a marijuana, decent men became criminals to support their pot “addiction,” and drug 
dealers thrived.
253
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National magazines, in turn, were filled with anti-marijuana headlines. In 1945 a 
Science Digest headline shouted “Menace of Marijuana.” In 1946 Business Week 
declared a “Hemp Menace.” On December 31, 1951, Newsweek featured an article 
entitled “Marines and Marijuana.” Films during this era espoused the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotic’s anti-marijuana messages specifically Devil’s Harvest (1942), Assassin of 
Youth (1937), and Marihuana (1936). Comic books of the era detailed the evils of 
marijuana. This included comics such as Adventure Comics (June 1939), Kerry Drake 
(1946), and The Ghost Rider. Even dictionaries and encyclopedias espoused the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics’ anti-marijuana messages. Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the 
English Language from 1957 defined the drug as: 
marijuana or marihuana (ma re hwa na) n. A weed or herb, growing in 
many parts of North America; the dried leaves of the plant, which have 
narcotic qualities when smoked in cigarettes; sometimes called the 
assassin of youth. 
Marijuana, or Hashish, a subtle, crazing drug which is being 
surreptitiously sold in U.S. in the form of cigarettes. Narcotic officials 
named it 'The Assassin of Youth,' and state that it is as dangerous as a 
coiled rattlesnake. Its effects when smoked vary with different individuals. 
It may make of its victim a philosopher, a joyous reveler, a mad insensate, 
or a fiendish murderer. Its purveyors whisper into the ears of Am. youth 
the wonders of a new cigarette with a real thrill, and without harmful 
effects. Students are lured to its use by promises of resultant keenness of 
mind, the easy solving of problems, an aid in exams. An addict was 
hanged in Baltimore in 1937 for a criminal assault on a ten-year-old girl. 
In Fla. a crazed youth killed his father, mother, two brothers, and a sister. 
In more than 30 cases of murder or degenerate sex crimes in 1937, 
marijuana proved to be a contributing cause. See Hashish.
254
 
This excerpt directly quotes Harry J. Anslinger’s article “Assassin of Youth” as 
well as references his congressional testimony before the House Ways and Means 
Committee regarding the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. This illustrates the impact 
Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ national anti-marijuana educational 
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campaign had on cultural expressions regarding marijuana from the 1930s through the 
1950s. It is also noteworthy to mention that Will Oursler, co-author of the pulp fiction 
novel Hooked (Narcotics: America’s Peril), co-authored The Murders: The Shocking 
Story of the Narcotics Gangs with Anslinger. Besides influencing pulp fiction, Anslinger 
obviously appreciated it and those who created it. 
All of the various anti-marijuana media expressions discussed in this chapter 
depict marijuana as an alien intrusion capable of destroying innocent lives and 
transforming normal individuals into sex-crazed, violent, or insane people. All of the 
media expressions, in turn, contributed to cannabis confusion among the American 
public. This confusion significantly contributed to the legal change in the status of the 
cannabis plant and helped solidify the definition of cannabis as marijuana and not hemp. 
However, cultural expressions like “reefer songs” illustrate that the nation as a whole did 
not accept the idea of marijuana as a dangerous drug. But the overwhelming evidence 
that the nation as a whole did not accept the definition of marijuana as a dangerous drug 
is the mere existence of an anti-drug media campaign designed to impart that definition to 
the masses. 
The LaGuardia Report 
In September of 1938, the New York Academy of Medicine was contacted by the 
mayor of New York City, Fiorello LaGuardia, about the marijuana problem. He wanted 
an impartial group to “make a survey of existing knowledge on the subject and carry out 
any observations required to determine the pertinent facts regarding this form of drug   
75 
 
addiction and the necessity of its control.”255 The New York Academy of Medicine 
referred the mayor’s request to the Committee on Public Health. A special subcommittee 
was appointed, which after reviewing the existing literature on marijuana determined that 
they “could come to no conclusion regarding the effect of marihuana upon the 
psychological and physiological functions of the human being.”256 The Subcommittee 
recommended that “it was time that a study of its effects be made based upon well-
established evidence, and prepared an outline of methods of procedure for the study of 
the problem.”257 They further recommended a sociological study as well as a clinical 
study of the drug. In January 1939 Mayor LaGuardia commissioned the Committee on 
Marihuana to conduct both studies. This committee was composed of the subcommittee 
of Public Health as well as five additional medical doctors. The doctors on the 
Committee on Marihuana studied the outline of the proposed plans for roughly a year 
before commencing either of the actual studies. In 1944 the results of the LaGuardia 
Report were released.  
In part, both the sociological study and the clinical study of marijuana contained 
in the LaGuardia Report attempted to test the validity of claims made about marijuana in 
both pro- and anti-marijuana media representations. In researching the history of the 
plant, the committee read the accounts that the Romantics of the nineteenth century wrote 
about their experiences with hashish, as well as their fictional accounts of hashish use.  
The conclusions of the Romantic authors “were that hashish could cause psychotic 
episodes and even death and that prolonged use would result in physical and mental 
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deterioration.”258 The Romantics were held in such high esteem that their conclusions 
were accepted almost as if they had written scientific monographs on the subject. 
According to the report these conclusions have been upheld by modern individuals of 
note and the government itself. Federal, state, and local agencies along with prominent 
individuals have asserted publicly that marijuana use is deleterious. Many of these groups 
claim that: 
marihuana smoking is widespread among school children; that the 
dispensers of the drug are organized to such an extent that they encourage 
the use of marihuana in order to create an ever-increasing market; that 
juvenile delinquency is directly related to the effects of the drug; that it is 
a causative factor in a large percentage of our major crimes and sexual 
offenses; and that physical and mental deterioration are the direct result of 
the prolonged habit of smoking marihuana.
259
 
 
Both studies attempted to address these views of marijuana. 
The sociological study was limited to the Borough of Manhattan. The following 
questions were posed by the researchers: 
1. To what extent is marihuana used? 
2. What is the method of retail distribution? 
3. What is the general attitude of the marihuana smoker toward society and
 toward the use of the drug? 
4. What is the relationship between marihuana and eroticism? 
5. What is the relationship between marihuana and crime? 
6. What is the relationship between marihuana and juvenile delinquency?260 
In attempting to discover the answers to these questions the researchers made wide-
ranging use of subjective data from non-smokers, marijuana smokers, and those who had 
direct knowledge of its effects but were not smokers. The researchers surveyed thirty-
nine different schools including grammar, middle, and high schools. They also placed 
many of these schools under surveillance. They interviewed principals and teachers 
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regarding marijuana use in their schools. The researchers also gathered information from 
various city and private agencies regarding the purported problem. 
The LaGuardia sociological study came to the following conclusions. Firstly, 
marijuana use was extensive throughout the Boroughs of Manhattan; however, the 
marijuana “problem” was not as severe as it was acknowledged to be in other parts of the 
United States. The introduction of the drug into Manhattan was recent in comparison with 
other areas. The low cost of the drug enabled it to be within the economic reach of most 
individuals.
261
 Harlem appeared to be the center of use and distribution. The majority of 
users were African-Americans or Latin-Americans. There existed a consensus among 
marijuana smokers that it “creates a definite feeling of adequacy.”262 A particularly 
controversial conclusion the study came to was that “the practice of smoking marihuana 
does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the word.”263 Despite popular belief, 
the sale and distribution of the drug was not controlled by a singular organized group of 
drug pushers.  
The last five conclusions were the most controversial in the eyes of Harry J. 
Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as they directly contradicted the beliefs 
espoused by the commissioner and his anti-marijuana agency. The sociological study 
concluded that marijuana was not a gateway drug to morphine, heroin, or cocaine. 
Marijuana was not the “determining factor in the commission of major crimes.”264 The 
use of marijuana, was not as popular belief held, widespread among schoolchildren nor 
was it a cause of juvenile delinquency. Finally the study concluded that the publicity 
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surrounding the “catastrophic effects of marihuana smoking in New York City” was 
unfounded.
265
 
The study also noted a surprisingly large number of schoolchildren were found to 
smoke regular tobacco cigarettes. The researchers found that many of these cigarettes 
were being obtained individually from men on the street or in candy stores. They 
suggested that this trade in cigarettes could be mistaken for trade in “reefers.”266 These 
conclusions directly contradict the anti-marijuana media representations of the era as well 
as the anti-marijuana messages espoused by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 
The LaGuardia clinical study dealt with the purported pleasurable effects of 
marijuana as well as the effects, which supposedly led to crime and anti-social acts. The 
researchers first selected five volunteers who had never smoked marijuana before. The 
main group for the study though was seventy-two inmates from Riker’s Island, Hart’s 
Island, and the House of Detention for Women. This group consisted of seven females 
and sixty-five males. After conducting months of clinical experiments the LaGuardia 
clinical study came to the following conclusions.  
The effects of marijuana were tested on the psychomotor functions of the 
subjects. The clinical study concluded reactions depended on the complexity of the 
function tested and the size of the dose. Simpler tasks such as tapping and simple reaction 
time were affected only minutely by larger doses (defined as 5 cc.) and almost negligibly 
by small doses (defined as 2 cc.). On the other hand, more complex tasks such as “static 
equilibrium, hand steadiness, and complex reaction time” were affected “adversely to a 
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considerable degree by the administration of both large and small doses of marihuana.”267 
The bodily functions that were most affected by marijuana use appeared to be steadiness 
of the body and hand. The effects of smoking marijuana were similar to those of 
ingesting the drug, but they occur “sooner and taper off more quickly.”268 The effects 
seem to be for the most part the same for men as well as women. “Auditory acuity is not 
affected by” marijuana and neither is musical ability. Perception of space and time also 
did not appear to be affected by the use of marijuana.
269
 A person’s basic personality did 
not change when on marijuana. The use of marijuana produced “increased feelings of 
relaxation, disinhibition, and self-confidence.” The increased feeling of confidence 
among users most often expressed itself through oral expressions instead of physical 
activity. The lack of inhibition from the use of marijuana “releases what is latent in the 
individual’s thoughts and emotions but does not evoke responses which would be totally 
alien to him in his undrugged state.” Marijuana can create not only pleasant feelings in 
those who smoke or ingest it, but also feelings of anxiety. Individuals who are socially 
awkward are more likely to use to marijuana than those who are more outgoing.
270
 
In response to the overall report and its results Mayor LaGuardia expressed that: 
 
The report of the present investigations covers every phase of the problem 
and is of practical value not only to our own city but to communities 
throughout the country. It is a basic contribution to medicine and 
pharmacology.  
I am glad that the sociological, psychological, and medical ills commonly 
attributed to marihuana have been found to be exaggerated insofar as the 
City of New York is concerned. I hasten to point out, however, that the 
findings are to be interpreted only as a reassuring report of progress and 
not as encouragement to indulgence, for I shall continue to enforce the 
laws, prohibiting the use of marihuana until and if complete findings may 
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justify an amendment to existing laws. The scientific part of the research 
will be continued in the hope that the drug may prove to possess 
therapeutic value for the control of drug addiction.
271
 
 
Whereas the results of the LaGuardia Report seemed to please many including Mayor 
LaGuardia, it also infuriated many individuals, especially Commissioner of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics Harry J. Anslinger. He asserted that the report declared the 
individuals and agencies who had been denouncing marijuana as a killer weed were not 
only mistaken, but were encouraging baseless fears about the drug. Anslinger felt that 
“the report was a government printed invitation to youth and adults--above all to teen 
agers--to go ahead and smoke all the reefers they felt like.”272 He referred to the report as 
“giddy sociology and medical mumbo jumbo.” Anslinger felt the report damaged his 
efforts at ridding the nation of this drug menace. He claimed that “syndicate lawyers and 
spokesmen . . . cited it in court cases, tried to spread the idea that the report had brought 
marijuana back into the folds of good society with a full pardon and a slap on the back 
from the medical profession.”273 From there Anslinger felt more lies about marijuana 
spread cropping up in panel discussions and public speeches by “informed” individuals. 
He believed that all of this served “to bewilder the public and make it unsure of its own 
judgments.”274 One might say that his own agency’s efforts towards cannabis confusion 
also served to bewilder the nation and make people doubt their own judgments. 
The Boggs Act 
In 1951 Representative Hale Boggs of Louisiana sponsored a bill that dictated 
mandatory minimum penalties for violating the Narcotic Import and Export Act of 1922 
and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. This was a dramatic move for the federal 
                                                          
271
 Ibid., v. 
272
 Anslinger and Oursler. The Murderers, 40. 
273
 Ibid., 41. 
274
 Anslinger and Oursler, The Murderers, 42.  
81 
 
government. This sweeping legislation lumped all narcotics and marijuana together 
concerning sentencing for the first time. According to medical historian David Musto, 
this law was particularly powerful because “although some states had even more severe 
sentences for some offenses, no state law had the breadth of jurisdiction or the unified 
enforcement service of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.”275 The first offense under this 
act would garner an individual a two year to five year sentence. A second offense would 
garner an individual five to ten years. A third offense and any subsequent offense dictated 
a ten year to twenty year sentence. Regardless of the number of offenses, each crime 
committed under this act also led to a two thousand dollar fine.
276
  
Why was there a need for this law, one might wonder, when non-medical narcotic 
use and marijuana use in general were already outlawed? Representative Boggs cited the 
dramatic increase in narcotic drug use as the main reason for the new law. He mentioned 
a 77 percent increase in drug arrests between 1948 and 1950.
277
 Historians Bonnie and 
Whitebread felt that “this indiscriminate treatment of marijuana as just another narcotic 
drug flew in the face of contemporary testimony challenging the assumption that the 
hemp drugs were addictive, crime-producing, and likely to lead to insanity and death.”278 
The Daniel-Boggs Narcotic Control Act of 1956 went a step further than the 
Boggs Act of 1951 by increasing mandatory minimums dramatically. The sale, transfer, 
or smuggling of narcotics for a first time offender now yielded a sentence of five to 
twenty years. Second and subsequent offenses would elicit a ten to twenty year prison 
term. Under this law no parole, probation, or sentence suspension was allowed. The fine 
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for all offenses was increased to twenty thousand dollars.
279
 These new sentencing 
practices put another nail in cannabis’s coffin.  
From the 1930s through the 1950s the federal government proselytized about the 
evils of marijuana. Legally marijuana was classified as a dangerous drug and there 
seemed to be a consensus especially in the 1950s among the American populace, which 
embraced this view of marijuana; however, this consensus was not as strong as it seemed.  
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Chapter Three: Kennedy, Nixon and Leary 
From the 1930s through the 1950s the federal government, specifically the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, fine tuned its war against marijuana. It hammered away at 
the notion that marijuana was a dangerous drug. Since the passage of the Marihuana Tax 
Act of 1937, according to scholar Lawrence Friedman, “the federal government, and 
most state governments have never looked back, never wavered, always stuck like glue to 
a single policy of prohibition, prohibition and more prohibition: interdiction at the source, 
the arrest of users and pushers, draconian punishments, and, on the official level no 
understanding, no mercy, no letup in the war.”280 The federal government also utilized 
the national media and every other avenue of publicity it could garner to spread the 
message that this plant was a “killer weed.” Even when confronted with contradictory 
findings from legitimate studies like the 1944 LaGuardia Report, Harry J. Anslinger and 
his agency, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, did not back down from their mission of 
ridding the nation of this supposed drug menace. The 1940s and 1950s may have been a 
time during which anti-marijuana propaganda was openly embraced by a majority of the 
American public, but the unquestioning stance of the populace could not be maintained 
indefinitely.  
In the 1960s a large portion of the youth of America began to openly question 
these supposed truths regarding marijuana. The harsh penalties under the Boggs Act of 
1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 when looked at with questioning eyes seemed 
even harsher when the supposed evils of marijuana were under fire. Soon the 
counterculture of America embraced marijuana wholeheartedly. This chapter will discuss 
the continued government campaign against marijuana in the 1960s and 1970s. It will 
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also reveal the emergence of marijuana in the counterculture as a portion of the American 
populace struggled to renegotiate the legal and cultural definition of marijuana. Of 
particular note will be a discussion of Leary v. United States of America and the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, as together they 
transformed American drug law. 
President Kennedy and Drug Abuse 
President John F. Kennedy aimed to deal with drugs in a fair and informed 
manner during his presidency. He wanted to analyze the current drug laws and 
government policies to see if they were truly beneficial to our nation. On September 27
th
 
and 28
th
, 1962 President Kennedy held a White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug 
Abuse in Washington, D.C. The participants included individuals from the Presidential 
Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics, which was comprised of members from the 
following federal departments: Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, Health, Education, and 
Welfare.
281
 The aims of the conference were as follows. First, to reexamine the entire 
problem of narcotics use in the America and evaluate it in the larger context of the abuse 
of drugs. Second, to emphasize the paucity of concrete data in the arena of drug abuse, 
“and to encourage the various segments of society involved in this problem to cooperate 
to develop a clear picture of what we face.”282 Third, to separate out the current 
controversies, differentiating from those aspects of the problem for which there exists 
clear data “but where those data are not widely known; i.e., the availability, cost, and 
differential advantages of the various types of tests to determine whether an individual is 
                                                          
281
 “Fact Sheet for the White Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, September 27th and 28th, 1962,”
 Harry J. Anslinger Papers, Box 8 Folder 5, Penn State University Special Collections Library. 
282
 “Aims of Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse for the White Conference on Narcotic and Drug
 Abuse, September 27
th
 and 28
th, 1962,” Harry J. Anslinger Papers, Box 8 Folder 5, Penn State
 University Special Collections Library. 
85 
 
using narcotic drugs” and those aspects for which no data has been collected. Further the 
committee was to delineate the role which each involved aspect of society--the judiciary, 
medical community, law enforcement, legislators, etc.--played in solving the problems. 
Finally the committee was “to get all responsible parties to address themselves to the dual 
problem we face that of dealing with treatment and rehabilitation of drug users, as well 
as, legislatively and financially supporting research.
283
 
President Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy both spoke to the 
conference goers. President Kennedy began his address by stating that: 
For more than half a century this Nation has faced persistent and difficult 
problems arising out of the abuse of narcotics and nonnarcotic drugs. It is 
especially tragic and upsetting that this great loss to our society in the 
form of human suffering and misery and lost productivity flows directly 
from agents which possess the capacity to relieve pain and suffering. 
Properly and expertly used, they contribute significantly to the 
improvement and betterment of our lives. 
 
This national problem merits national concern. I’m confident that the 
White House conference, the first ever held in this field, will help focus 
attention on the various aspects of the problem and, most importantly, will 
permit a pooling of our information and experiences to the end that an 
orderly, vigorous, and direct attack can be undertaken at all levels, local, 
State, Federal, and international.
284
 
 
It is clear that President Kennedy took this conference and the opinions of the 
attendees seriously. He asserted that: 
I don’t think there is any area on which a conference could be held where 
the members of the conference could play a more significant role. This 
conference and its members, I know, do not consider themselves as 
ornamental fixtures to give sort of a public look at a problem; instead, we 
want direct guidance from you, and this mixture of talents and experiences 
which are brought together here at this White House conference, the first 
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one ever held in this field, can serve as a very positive base for much more 
comprehensive action by us all. 
What you do here we will attempt, and what you suggest we will attempt 
to implement, and I think after a year has gone by we can make a real 
judgment on the success of this conference.
285
 
 
During the White House conference President Kennedy also presented a special 
citation to Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger for his service to the nation, praising 
Anslinger for his efforts combating drug abuse and trafficking. Anslinger, representing 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics at the White House conference, spoke briefly to the 
attendees. In regards to marijuana he admitted that the nation had a significant problem 
since the “traffic in and abuse of cannabis” was increasing with little or no progress being 
“made in control of this drug.” 286 A preassembled panel selected by President Kennedy 
and made up of experts in drug abuse and control was asked for initial findings to present 
to the conference. This Ad Hoc Panel declared that “it is the opinion of the Panel that the 
hazards of marihuana use have been exaggerated and that long criminal sentences 
imposed on an occasional user or possessor of the drug are in poor social perspective.”287 
This was contradictory to everything Anslinger had been saying and fighting for during 
his career at the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. However, this declaration did not really 
impact the status of marijuana. President Kennedy wanted further study to be conducted 
to answer the aforementioned concerns so the White House conference established the 
Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse to examine these and other 
questions raised by the conference.   
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The Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse issued its findings in 
1963. In direct contradiction to the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 
1956, the commission recommended the relaxation of mandatory minimum sentences. It 
also recommended an increase in funding for research into narcotics and drug abuse. The 
commission felt the Federal Bureau of Narcotics should be dismantled and its various 
functions allocated to other governmental departments, including Justice, and Health, 
Education, and Welfare. The commission continued the federal policy of lumping 
marijuana in with narcotics, but according to medical historian David Musto, “suggested 
a policy that would shift the criteria for regulatory decisions regarding addicts and other 
drug users away from enforcement agencies and to the health professions.”288 The 
recommendations of the committee did not come to immediate fruition. Despite the 
seriousness President Kennedy had attached to that commission’s findings following his 
assassination, his successor President Johnson did not change the status quo regarding 
American drug laws. 
Besides being the year of President Kennedy’s White House Conference on 
Narcotic and Drug Abuse, 1962 was significant because it marked the forced retirement 
of Harry J. Anslinger. He had reached mandatory retirement age for federal employees. 
Anslinger served as head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for thirty-two years, worked 
under five presidents, and had greatly shaped the American War on Drugs. His reign was 
over as the top drug official in America, but other drug warriors carried on his cause.  
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Drug Abuse 
President Lyndon B. Johnson took over the American war on drugs after 
President Kennedy was assassinated. He was not as enthusiastic about reviewing the 
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American drug laws as President Kennedy had been. Johnson did focus on a social issue 
when he declared a war on poverty.
289
 He was, however, responsible for the creation of 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. This agency was created 1968 and 
combined the Treasury Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics with the Health, 
Education and Welfare Department’s Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. The FBN’s was 
responsible for marijuana, heroin and other narcotics while the BDAC only had 
jurisdiction over stimulants, depressants, and hallucinogens. This new agency now had 
the jurisdiction over all illegal drugs. It was under the aegis of the Justice Department and 
was the precursor to today’s DEA.290 Other than the creation of the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs, President Johnson did little during his presidency to affect the 
status of cannabis in America. 
Alternative Views of Marijuana  
Before the 1960s a large segment of the population of white, middle-class 
America feared the incursion of demons such as marijuana into the lives of their children 
and neighbors. This is evident by the acceptance and push for laws such as the Boggs Act 
of 1951 and the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, which meted out harsh mandatory 
minimums for drug offenses. For the most part, in the United States prior to 1960, use of 
marijuana was primarily restricted to minorities such as African Americans or Hispanic 
immigrants. However, during the 1960s white, middle-class Americans, especially 
college age individuals, began to discover marijuana with increasing frequency. By 1970, 
it was estimated that over eight million Americans had smoked marijuana at some 
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time.
291
 Those individuals involved in the hippie movement tended to be involved with 
drugs of some nature, primarily hallucinogens. Marijuana, though, was very popular 
because it could be used more frequently and casually than major hallucinogens.
292
 
According to religious historian, Robert Fuller, in the 1960s and 1970s, smoking 
marijuana was a rite of passage and of initiation into the counterculture.
293
 Historian 
David Musto went further asserting that: 
Marihuana’s increasing popularity in the U.S. created a gap between those 
who used it without becoming maniacs and the society that believed it had 
vicious effects. Youth, especially, grew doubtful that drug warnings had 
any creditability, since marihuana was being exposed after a quarter of a 
century as less than ‘the most dangerous habit-forming drug of them all.’ 
Perhaps as a result, more accurate information on other drugs, such as 
amphetamines, was ignored. Long sentences for marihuana possession 
became examples to youth of an ignorant establishment’s show of force. 
Confidence in the courts and fear as a deterrent to drug use declined. 
Sentiment began to favor a general reevaluation of drug laws to reflect 
both current medical and sociological information and beliefs.
294
 
 
In 1966 the head of the Food and Drug Administration, Dr. James Goddard, told 
an audience of 2,000 students at Cornell University “that the penalties for using 
marijuana [were] ‘too severe.’”295 The student attendees of the Cornell sponsored 
symposium were vocal in their agreement. The experts who spoke were not advocating 
legalization of marijuana though, but like much of the youth of America questioned the 
strictness and severity of America’s drug laws particularly those regarding marijuana. 
Headlines in the national press in the late 1960s and early 1970s began to reflect 
the growing acceptance of marijuana among the counterculture and particularly the youth 
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of America. In June of 1972 Science Digest questioned if “Pot smoking: less harm than 
feared?”296 On July 3, 1972, Newsweek announced the “AMA: switch on pot.”297 In 
January of 1973 The New York Times Magazine discussed the “Pot lobby,” highlighting 
the formation and activities of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana 
Law.
298
 These articles were countered with dozens of articles against marijuana. Both 
positive and negative articles were significant because they highlighted the battle over the 
meaning of marijuana.  
There were many pro-marijuana cultural expressions in the 1960s and 1970s 
including books, songs, and artwork, but as far as enduring expressions there is one book 
that comes to mind, The Marihuana Papers. The Marihuana Papers, edited by David 
Solomon, was a significant example of popular dissent in print regarding marijuana. The 
decidedly pro-marijuana text quickly went through three printing from 1966 to 1968 and 
is still in print today. It is continually cited by other researchers in the drug field 
including among others, David Musto, Richard Bonnie, and Charles Whitebread II. The 
book attempted to illuminate “the facts behind the myths” surrounding marijuana in 
American culture.
299
 According to Solomon, the text was assembled, therefore, “with the 
express purpose of supplying the accurate and authoritative information needed to 
perform the belated rites for the marihuana myths.”300 Further, the book should serve 
both to assist in changing people’s minds as well as assisting those who campaign for 
marijuana’s legality. Solomon asserted in his foreword that marijuana should be 
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legalized. He argued that “since it is in no demonstrable way poisonous and harmful, as 
are nicotine and alcohol, marihuana should be granted at least the same public availability 
and legal status as tobacco and liquor.
301
 The book featured an introduction by noted 
Indiana University sociologist and pro-marijuana advocate Alfred Lindesmith. Notably, it 
also included a passionate defense of marijuana by famous counterculture activist and 
poet Allen Ginsberg as well as an article by psychologist turned drug guru Timothy 
Leary. The text contained the 1944 LaGuardia Report as well as a variety of articles by 
doctors, historians, scientists, and writers. The Marihuana Papers represented a unique 
opportunity, a coming together of all major marijuana proponents of the era in one text. 
This gave a unique and powerful voice to the popular dissent regarding the status of 
marijuana in America. 
The popular acceptance of marijuana by a significant portion of America’s youth 
increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This popular movement was, in many regards, 
influenced by individuals such as Allen Ginsberg, Richard Alpert (former Harvard 
psychologist), and Timothy Leary. It was the latter’s efforts that resulted in major legal 
changes in America’s drug laws and specifically marijuana laws. 
Leary v. United States of America 
On December 22, 1965, Dr. Timothy Leary, an American psychologist, was 
arrested for marijuana possession in Laredo, Texas. This arrest may not have shocked the 
nation as Timothy Leary, formerly of Harvard, was well known for his drug use and his 
proselytizing for the use of hallucinogens, but the outcome would significantly impact the 
drug laws of our nation.  
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The psychologist turned drug guru was known for the popular slogan and hippie 
anthem “turn on, tune in, and drop out.” Leary considered psilocybin, mescaline, and 
LSD to be the major hallucinogens of the hippie movement, viewing marijuana and 
alcohol as the more minor hallucinogens used by this counterculture group.
302
 However, 
it was his possession of marijuana that caused him the most legal trouble. That fateful day 
in December of 1965 Leary and some companions, including his daughter, were 
travelling by car to Mexico. They were denied entry to Mexico after crossing the 
International Bridge at Laredo, Texas. After turning around, Leary’s car was 
subsequently inspected by United States Custom officials who discovered a small amount 
of marijuana, less than half an ounce. Leary was charged with “transporting and 
concealing marihuana illegally brought into the United States; and transporting and 
concealing marihuana without paying the transfer tax imposed by the Marihuana Tax 
Act.”303 The smuggling charge was subsequently dropped, but Leary was tried and 
ultimately found guilty of the last two counts of violating provisions of the Marihuana 
Tax Act of 1937. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison and fined thirty thousand 
dollars. Leary fought his conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis 
that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 under which he was convicted violated the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Leary also argued that he was denied 
due process due to a statutory presumption in the Narcotic Import and Export Act “that 
possession of marihuana is sufficient evidence both of its illegal importation and of the 
defendant’s knowledge of its illegal importation.”304 In 1969 the Supreme Court found in 
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favor of Leary and ruled that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and the Narcotic Import and 
Export Act of 1922 were both unconstitutional. The Court ruled: 
that by requiring the petitioner to obtain an order form from the 
government for the transfer of marihuana; the Marihuana Tax Act 
compelled him to identify himself not only as a transferee but also as a 
nonregistered transferee within the meaning of the act. The Act directed 
that the information required by the registration provisions be conveyed by 
the Internal Revenue Service to state and local law enforcement agencies 
on request. Since the petitioner [Leary] was not a person, who, under state 
law, might be able to legally possess marihuana, the Court found that he 
was therefore one of a class constituting ‘a select group inherently suspect 
of criminal activities.’ Thus, petitioner had ample reasons to fear that 
transmittal to state officials that he was an unregistered transferee of 
marihuana ‘would surely prove a significant link in a chain of evidence 
tending to establish his guilt’ under the state marihuana laws then in 
effect.
305
 
 
Leary v. United States was a major if temporary win for pro-marijuana activists. 
Besides the legal structure of American drug law collapsing, the drug enforcement 
arena was also shaken up around the same time. In 1968 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Justice Department and significantly 
revamped. It was merged with the enforcement agency in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to become the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
306
 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970 
Since the ruling in Leary v. United States deemed that both the Narcotic Drug 
Import and Export Act of 1922 and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 were 
unconstitutional, that left a legal gap in federal drug law. As the Boggs Act of 1951 and 
the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 meted out harsh mandatory minimums for violating 
provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and the Narcotic Import and Export Act of 
1922, both of these laws were null and void too. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
                                                          
305
 Ibid. 
306
 Musto, The American Disease, 248. 
94 
 
Prevention and Control Act quickly filled that gap. The law was in part “a response to a 
perceived drug crisis.”307 According to legal scholar, Ruth D. Peterson, “during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, public and political concern about drugs reached near crisis 
proportions” because of “new patterns of drug use, abuse, and trafficking . . . among 
middle and upper class white youth.”308 President Nixon urged Congress to pass new 
drug legislation, declaring: 
Within the last decade, the abuse of drugs has grown from essentially a 
local police problem into a serious national threat to the personal health 
and safety of millions of Americans. A national awareness of the gravity 
of the situation is needed; a new urgency and concerted national policy are 
needed at the Federal level to begin to cope with this growing menace to 
the general welfare of the United States.
309
 
 
Congress responded swiftly and made drastic changes in the structure of our 
nation’s drug control. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
“consolidated nearly all existing federal drug legislation, and changed the basis of federal 
drug control from Congress’ powers to tax and to control imports to the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.”310 The law established five schedules into 
which various drugs were classified. These schedules were separated by the degree 
substances were deemed to have the potential for abuse and/or dependency, and whether 
or not they were viewed to have any potential medical use. Schedule One is considered to 
contain the most dangerous drugs, which have a high likelihood of abuse and dependency 
as well as having no discernible medical use.
311
 Despite the increasing use of marijuana 
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among the American public and the ever more vocal demands for lenient laws or 
legalization of the drug, Congress sought to include marijuana in Schedule One alongside 
heroin and LSD. Cocaine was even included in Schedule Two. Despite this seemingly 
harsh treatment of marijuana, the law established no mandatory minimum sentences. The 
penalty provisions of the law were actually much less severe than those proposed by 
Nixon and his administration.
312
 Nixon signed the bill into law on October 27, 1970 
concluding by making the following remark. 
I hope that at the time the Federal Government is moving, as we are 
moving very strongly in this field, that the whole Nation will join with us 
in a program to stop the rise in the use of drugs and thereby help to stop 
the rise in crime; and also save the lives of hundreds of thousands of our 
young people who otherwise would become hooked on drugs and be 
physically, mentally, and morally destroyed.
313
 
 
President Nixon Declares a “War on Drugs” 
On September 16, 1968, Richard Nixon, then a presidential candidate, vowed to a 
California audience that he would attack the source of drugs and “accelerate the 
development of tools and weapons to detect narcotics in transit.”314 President Nixon 
faced a tough challenge as drug use and trafficking was rampant in the United States. His 
own head of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had declared that the nation 
had “failed miserably” in the control of drug abuse.315 President Nixon had a choice. He 
could abandon the battle Anslinger and others had fought or launch a full blown drug 
war. He chose the latter.  
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Since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt American presidents have used 
broadcast media to address the American people, but President Nixon “introduced the 
televised primetime address, between 8:00 and 10:00pm, to reach as many citizens as 
possible.”316 He chose that medium to announce his stance on drugs. In a June 17, 1971 
televised speech he announced a “war on drugs.”317 He declared “America’s public 
enemy number one” to be “drug abuse”318 and asked Congress for $155 million in funds, 
which would bring the total drug abuse budget to roughly $350 million. This dramatic 
increase in the budget would be utilized for drug abuse treatment as well as 
enforcement.
319
  
President Nixon did perhaps more than any previous president in an attempt to 
combat drug use in the United States. Besides urging Congress to pass the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, he instituted “Operation 
Intercept,” launched a three year media campaign in conjunction with the Advertising 
Council, Inc., mandated Drug Abuse Prevention weeks four years in a row (1970-1973), 
established the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, and attempted to assist the 
Mexican government in eradicating Mexican marijuana crops. 
“Operation Intercept” was an effort by the federal government to stop the flow of 
marijuana into the United States from Mexico. Roughly 80 percent of the national black 
market marijuana supply came from Mexico each year. Nixon planned to have American 
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border agents stop and search every car coming across the Mexican border.
320
 The United 
States government attempted to work in conjunction with the Mexican government with 
very little cooperation or success. The operation was supposed to be kept confidential 
until it officially started, but following a news leak from within the Justice Department 
“‘the nation’s largest peacetime search and seizure operation by civil authorities’ became 
front-page news.”321 Despite the leak, the government went ahead with several test runs 
in Brownsville and El Paso, Texas on September 13, 1969. “Operation Intercept” 
officially began on September 21, 1969.
322
 Along the border over 4.5 million people and 
their possessions were searched throughout the course of the operation. The government 
operation also took place via air and sea. The Coast Guard searched small boats along the 
coast of Southern California and Texas. Small military planes looked for suspicious 
aircraft as did military radar technicians. Along the border twenty-three radar installations 
were utilized. They were often ineffective though as the communications equipment was 
out-dated.
323
 Ultimately “Operation Intercept” was scrapped after three weeks in action. 
In many regards, “Operation Intercept” was successful. It did impede the flow of 
marijuana over the Mexican border by vehicle. The grand total of seizures was “60 
pounds of peyote, 20 cc of morphine, a quarter of an ounce of cocaine, 1603 grams of 
heroin, 58 cc of Demerol, 83 codeine pills, 100 Percodan tablets, 78 pounds of hashish, 
3202 pounds of marijuana, and one morphine tablet.”324 Although some success was 
made, the entire operation was not very efficient or cost effective. It involved over two 
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thousand employees and over $30 million of taxpayer money. It also caused other issues. 
As Harry Levine and Craig Renairman noted: 
Even when interdiction does affect the supply of a criminalized substance, 
the effects are often ironic. The partial success of the Nixon 
administration’s ‘Operation Intercept,’ for example, gave rise to what is 
now a huge domestic marijuana industry, which produces far more potent 
strains of marijuana and has become more decentralized and democratic as 
armed helicopter raids have increased.
325
 
 
Additionally, as many interviewees on the Huntley Brinkley Show complained, the 
border inspections caused massive traffic jams, which led some individuals to remain 
stuck in traffic for upwards of six hours.
326
 According to historian Richard B. Craig, 
“Operation Intercept” was not what it seemed. He felt that “it was not designed to 
interdict narcotics but to publicize the new administration’s war on crime and force 
Mexican compliance with Washington’s anti-drug campaign.”327 Whether or not that was 
the intention, it certainly sparked controversy, gained attention for the “war on drugs,” 
and fostered Mexican hostility for American anti-drug policy. 
On March 11, 1970, President Nixon made a statement to the public regarding an 
expansion of the federal program to combat drug abuse. He announced the following: 
-a $3.5 million program operated by the Office of Education to train 
school personnel, particularly teachers, in the fundamentals of drug abuse 
education; 
 
-creation of a National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information and 
Education, giving the public one central office to contact; 
 
-publication of a book in which, for the first time, all of the concerned 
Federal departments and agencies have pooled their knowledge of the 
national drug problem; 
                                                          
325
 Levine and Reinarman, “From Prohibition to Regulation,” 473. 
326
 “Hunt Brinkley Show Script” Advertising Council Archives 13/2/219 Box 8 Folder 5, University of
 Illinois at Urbana-Champaign University Archives. 
327
 Craig, “Operation Intercept,” 556.  
99 
 
-modification of a program of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration to allow large cities to apply for funds to be used for drug 
education, as well as for law enforcement; 
 
-development by the Advertising Council of an expanded public service 
campaign on drug abuse in cooperation with the media and the Federal 
Government; 
 
-close cooperation of the administration with concerned citizens’ 
organizations
328
 
 
This was a major expansion of the federal government’s programs regarding drugs. A key 
part of that expansion was the Drug Abuse Information Campaign. 
On March 13, 1970, the Drug Abuse Information Campaign was presented to 
President Nixon at the White House by members of the Advertising Council, Inc., a non-
profit group of advertisers who created public service campaigns. He gave it his hearty 
endorsement. Days later on March 25, the president of the Advertising Council, Richard 
P. Keim, testified before the U.S. Senate Special Sub-Committee on Alcoholism and 
Narcotics. He presented the campaign in its entirety and was subsequently commended 
by the committee.
329
 The campaign was officially presented by the Compton Ad Agency 
on behalf of the Advertising Council to the national media at a press conference on July 
8, 1970 in New York City. It was announced that the President desired “an advertising 
campaign be created to ‘un-sell’ drugs to all Americans--particularly young 
Americans.”330 Besides revealing the campaign, the Compton Ad Agency detailed the 
methods behind the campaign to the gathered media outlets. Those behind the media 
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campaign first attended a three day conference on communication and drug abuse at 
Rutgers University. Then they began to gather and review current anti-drug films, 
booklets, and books and try to learn from them. They met frequently with their 
government clients including members of the administration and agents from the Bureau 
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and conducted research among the target audiences, 
particularly teens.
331
 Then they took their designs in storyboard form to the streets, 
church groups, and schoolyards, gathering information about what the public responded 
well to and what they did not like. The main objective of the campaign was “to counter 
peer pressure by arming youngsters with a way to reject the offer of drugs without losing 
face” as well as “to educate them to the dangers of narcotics, with meaningful reasons 
why they should stay away from their use.”332 After the initial press conference the media 
campaign was gradually highlighted to local media outlets at events such as conventions 
of radio broadcasters and at the luncheon of the Outdoor Advertising Association. By the 
end of 1970 a variety of radio spots, television spots, direct mailings, billboards, and print 
ads appeared nationally.
333
 Many celebrities participated in the campaign including Art 
Linkletter, Steve Allen, Pat Boone, and Carroll O’Connor. President Richard Nixon even 
invited Elvis Presley to assist in the anti-drug campaign.
334
 Besides the advertisements, 
Nixon’s administration and the Advertising Council had elicited the support of twenty 
television programs. These programs vowed to include anti-drug messages in their shows 
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in the fall season of 1970. The executives and writers agreed to make the anti-drug 
messages flow naturally as part of the story and not be a “straight-out sermon.”335  
Many of the public service announcements and print advertisements were 
extremely generic in their anti-drug message, but a large percentage directly espoused an 
anti-marijuana message. These commercials approached marijuana from a variety of 
avenues. All of these anti-marijuana advertisements were aired frequently throughout the 
nation. For instance “Nobody Home” targeted pre- teens and teenagers, and made fun of 
pot smokers. It involved three pre-teen boys leaving the schoolyard after playing 
basketball. It is a peer group approach as it utilized members of the same peer group as 
the target audience to illustrate to them how to cope with drugs in their own peer group. 
 Kid 1: Man, I got some grass. 
 Kid 2: Yeah? 
Kid 1: And no one’s home at my house. Wanna come over and 
smoke? 
 Kid 2: Nah. 
 Kid 3: Its great stuff, we’ll really get high. 
 Kid 2: Nah, I just don’t want to. 
 Kid 1: I said no one’s home. 
 Kid 2: Why so sneaky? 
 Kid 1: Because it’s against the law, stupid. 
 Kid 2: I’m stupid?  Why do you think they call it dope?336 
 
This advertisement featured the phrase “why do you think they call it dope,” which 
would become the most memorable and utilized tagline of the whole Drug Abuse 
Information campaign. 
“Kid Sister” was a very brief radio spot targeted at teenagers, attempting to get 
them to reevaluate their own actions.  
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Kid: . . . Smoke a few joints now and then, get high and you 
groove. 
Announcer: What if your kid sister smoked pot? 
Kid: I’d break her head!337 
 
“Walk Out” featured an argument between parents and child. The parents lacked 
the proper information for a calm discussion and thus the son is antagonistic. 
SFX: DOOR SLAMS. 
KID: Hey Dad. What’s happening? 
DAD: I’ll show you what’s happening. Get in that room. Now your 
mother found that in your room, will you please explain it? 
KID: It’s nothing. 
MOM: What’s it called, John? 
KID: Dope, grass, whatever you want to call it. 
MOM: Then you must be known as a junkie? 
KID: No. Dad, I’m sorry, but it’s just what I like to do. 
MOM: You say it’s not hurting you. What about me? What am I 
supposed to tell the neighbors? 
KID: Look, you drink. I see you ambling through the kitchen. 
MOM: My name is just going to be mud. 
DAD: We built up respect in this town. Why are you tearing us 
down? 
KID: I’m not tearing you down; I’m the only one that I’ll hurt. 
DAD: What’s the next step? 
KID: You people are fools. You don’t know what you’re talking 
about. 
ANNOUNCER: Before you talk with your child, you ought to read 
this free booklet about drug abuse. It’s written by people who 
know what they’re talking about. 
. . . Do it before it’s too late. 
DOOR SLAMS AS BOY RUNS OUT.
338
 
 
Another ad which attempted to overcome parental ignorance was “Hash.” 
VOICE: If you’re a parent and you think hash is corned beef and potatoes 
fried in a skillet—you’re in trouble. 
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ANNOUNCER: Questions about hashish and other abusable drugs are 
answered in the Federal source book: “Answers to the most frequently 
asked questions about drug abuse.” 
For your free copy send to: 
Drug Abuse Information 
Box 1080 
Washington, D.C. 20013 
Send for the booklet, then talk with your kids—it’s important.339 
 
“Stoned Buddy” targeted soldiers during the Vietnam War. It featured a soldier 
leaning against a tree smoking marijuana. He visualized the potential effects his actions 
could have in a variety of crucial situations. This was a peer group approach 
advertisement and also involved some mild shock tactics. This was clearly in response to 
rampant drug use among soldiers in Vietnam. 
VO: How would you like the guy laying down cover fire for you, stoned?! 
SFX: GUN FIRE, THEN STOPS. 
VO: How would you like the medic who’s patching you up a hole in you, 
stoned?! 
SFX: MEDIC PEERING AT WOUNDED SOLDIER WHILE 
HELICOPTOR HOVERS 
VO: How would you like the clerk who’s typing your orders for home, 
stoned?! 
SFX: POOR TYPING (COULD CARE LESS) 
VO: How would your buddy like you stoned . . . when he really needs 
you.  
No matter where you’re stationed or what kind of uniform you’re wearing, 
it’s dumb to get stoned . . . but then why do you think they call it dope?340 
 
Finally, “Acapulco Gold” showed a marijuana joint being rolled. 
Announcer: Some people say that in a matter of months, Acapulco Gold 
will be available over the counter, menthol, and king size, which is an 
indication about how little people know about marijuana. Today research 
scientists are studying its effects on the brain, the nervous system, 
chromosomes, various organs of the body. Maybe it will turn out there’s 
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no reason for it to be illegal. But nobody can be sure until all the facts are 
in, and until they are, it’s a pretty bum risk. 341 
 
As part of many of these public service announcements Americans were asked to 
write away for a booklet on drug abuse. This booklet contained answers to frequently 
asked questions about drugs. Its questions and answers tell much about the federal 
government’s continued fight against marijuana. The booklet featured twenty-seven 
specific questions regarding marijuana and eleven generic drug questions. No other 
specific drug was given any particular attention. The government did admit in this 
brochure that marijuana is not physically addictive, acknowledging recent medical 
findings; however it maintained its position that it should remain illegal.
342
 
On November 19
th
 and 20
th
, 1972, a conference entitled “Communication as a 
Factor in the Control of Drug Abuse” was held. The participants were members of “top 
levels of communication leadership, the behavioral sciences, and government.”343 The 
purpose of the conference was “to explore the general area of effect of communications 
in generating positive attitudes to abuse of drugs and, as a corollary, the potential of 
communications in reducing such attitudes.”344 They also aimed to discuss target 
populations for anti-drug media and to suggest potential “criteria for the evaluation of 
media stimuli.” In preparation for the conference a series of anti-drug commercials were 
shown to four target audience test groups including: middle class mothers of teens, 
middle class teenagers, “ghetto” teenagers, and a group of ex-addicts (five members of 
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the “Ghetto Brothers”). Their reactions to these advertisements were filmed for 
conference participants to view and discuss. “Acapulco Gold,” “Walk Out,” and “Nobody 
Home” were shown to the test groups as well as to conference attendees. Many of the test 
group participants thought that “Acapulco Gold” was confusing and initially thought that 
it was selling marijuana. The majority of the test group participants including mothers 
and teenagers also expressed a good deal of skepticism as whether or not marijuana was 
truly harmful or not. The group of mothers was primarily concerned with marijuana’s 
potential to lead to other harder drugs. They were also concerned about the illegality of 
the substance affecting their teenagers. The teenagers in the test groups found the anti-
marijuana commercials lacking in credibility.
345
 Regarding “Walk Out,” the group of 
mothers easily projected themselves into the situation, identifying with the parents in the 
commercial. The teenagers on the other hand were outraged at the parents’ insensitivity 
in the advertisement and did not seem to care what neighbors thought of their actions. 
“No One Home” was unilaterally appreciated by the mothers. They especially liked that 
the boy who said no to marijuana was made a hero. On the other hand, the teenagers 
found the commercial stupid.
346
 In general, the teenagers in the test groups felt that 
merely saying drugs are bad for you will not dissuade anyone from taking them. They 
also seemed to believe there was no danger in smoking marijuana. 
Nixon’s Drug Abuse Information campaign was revolutionary. It targeted a 
variety of groups including different generations and ethnicities. It also managed to 
inform a national audience about the dangers of drugs without utilizing too many scare 
tactics. It was the first federally funded campaign of its kind. Anslinger’s previous 
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educational campaign was nothing compared to the scope and reach of this more modern 
anti-drug campaign. However, like Nixon’s presidency, the Drug Abuse Information 
Campaign did not last that long. The media campaign was terminated June 30, 1973, as 
Congress did not allot further funding.
347
  
On January 28, 1972, President Nixon reflected on the successes of his anti-drug 
efforts. According to him: 
Tens of thousands of teachers, students, and community leaders have been 
trained under our National Drug Education Training Program. A new 
National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information has been established. 
Some 25 million pieces of drug education information have been 
distributed by the Federal Government. We have established a Federal 
Drug Abuse Prevention Coordinating Committee at the interagency level 
and a number of White House conferences on drug abuse have been 
conducted. 
 
In addition, the Federal Government is carrying out a number of major 
research programs to help us better identify and analyze drugs and more 
fully understand how they are moved about the country and around the 
world.
348
 
 
Drug Abuse Prevention Week was a tactic used by the federal government to 
draw attention to the nation’s drug problem. During President Nixon’s presidency these 
weeks were observed from 1970 through 1973. Activities were planned in the capital and 
states were encouraged to participate. On September 17, 1971, Nixon issued a 
proclamation for that year’s Drug Abuse Prevention Week. He called the nation to heed 
the dangers of drugs.  
What can a nation profit from its abundant good life, if the same 
technology and material wealth which have yielded that abundance 
permits millions of its people, particularly its youth, to drift into the 
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chemical modification of mind and mood at grave risk to their health—to 
their very lives? What can a nation profit from its unparalleled individual 
freedom, if that liberty becomes license and that license leads to drug 
dependence which controls the bodies and warps the minds of men, 
women, children, and even the unborn? 
 
Not so long ago it was easy enough to regard the tragedy of drug abuse as 
‘someone else’s problem.’ But recent years have brought that tragedy 
home--often very literally—to all Americans . . . Drug abuse is nothing 
less than a life and death matter for countless Americans, and for the 
moral fiber of this Nation. The drive to meet this threat must command 
from us our bet—our attention, our energies, our resources and our 
prayers.
349
  
 
From October 7 through the 13, 1973, the Federal Government held its final Drug 
Abuse Prevention Week under President Nixon. Unlike previous weeks this week was 
organized by the Advertising Council, Inc. This group of advertisers dedicated their time 
and efforts to public service campaigns. Their first involvement on an anti-drug campaign 
began under the aegis of President Nixon. This involvement in anti-drug public service 
campaigns remains today and will be further discussed in the next chapter. The previous 
Drug Abuse Prevention Weeks were not as successful or organized as the White House 
wanted so they called in the Advertising Council. The theme of that particular week was 
“the role of family in preventing drug abuse.”350 The Council wanted the activities of the 
week to include state, local, and private agencies in their design and implementation. The 
Council emphasized the need for getting away from the idea that the drug problem will 
disappear with one week’s efforts. They also aimed to utilize eight journalism students to 
tour the nation in order to conduct research about Drug Abuse Prevention Week. A 
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notable inclusion in the plans for the week was the desire to include any Top 40 singles, 
which were consistent with the family oriented anti-drug theme.
351
 
In 1972 President Nixon established the Commission on Marihuana and Drug 
Abuse. This group was comprised of thirteen individuals who were selected by Nixon 
himself as well as the Speaker of the House and the president pro tem of the Senate. The 
commission was given a year to report back on marijuana and in two years on general 
drug abuse in America. As the commission was rather traditional and right-wing, Nixon 
had no reason to believe that the commission would come back with findings that 
disagreed with his belief that marijuana was a dangerous drug that deserved its Schedule 
One status. The commission, however, came back with findings which contradicted the 
president and the federal government’s official stance on the drug. They recommended 
that small amounts of the drug should be decriminalized and thus subject to fines similar 
to parking tickets instead of jail time. They still maintained that dealing in large 
quantities for profit would be a felony. The commission concluded by issuing the 
following statement. 
On the basis of our findings . . . we have concluded that society should 
seek to discourage use, while concentrating its attention on the prevention 
and treatment of heavy and very heavy use. The Commission feels that the 
criminalization of possession of marihuana for personal use is socially 
self-defeating as a means of achieving this objective . . .We have carefully 
analyzed the interrelationship between marihuana the drug, marihuana use 
as a behavior, and marihuana as a social problem. Recognizing the 
extensive degree of misinformation about marihuana as a drug, we have 
tried to demythologize it. Viewing the use of marihuana in its wider social 
context, we have tried to desymbolize it.  
Considering the range of social concerns in contemporary America, 
marihuana does not, in our considered judgment, rank very high. We 
would deemphasize marihuana as a problem.  
The existing social and legal policy is out of proportion to the individual 
and social harm engendered by the use of the drug. To replace it, we have 
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attempted to design a suitable social policy, which we believe is fair, 
cautious and attuned to the social realities of our time.
 352 
 
President Nixon adamantly disagreed with the findings of the commission and refused to 
publicly receive the document containing the commission’s report.  
In 1973 the federal government began to provide funding to the Mexican 
government to be used to eradicate marijuana crops in that nation. The Mexican 
government was given upwards of $40 million to purchase helicopters, planes, and the 
pesticide paraquat.
353
 This was a very controversial thing for Nixon to do as paraquat is 
“a highly toxic herbicide that affects the lungs, liver, kidneys and cornea.”354 However, 
presidents after him carried on the program, despite public outcry against its 
environmental impact and toxicity to humans. It did temporarily cut importation of 
marijuana into the United States, as well as curb some individuals’ usage of the drug for 
fear of ingesting paraquat.
355
 However, there were unintended consequences, both 
environmental and those affecting domestic production of the plant. Environmental costs 
included the killing of animals, plants, people, and the contamination of water supplies.
356
 
These environmental factors led paraquat to be banned in the United States in the early 
1980s. The Mexican eradication program not only affected the environment, but also 
dramatically changed U.S. production of the plant. Domestic production of marijuana 
increased because of the fear of paraquat and the lower amount of the drug being 
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imported. To deal with demand for marijuana in the United States, drug entrepreneurs 
saw opportunity because of the Mexican eradication program. According to scholar 
Michael Pollan, U.S. growers faced challenges initially besides the obvious legal 
challenges. The strains of cannabis that they were attempting to grow primarily came 
from seeds suited to growing in regions like Colombia or Mexico. Plants from these 
seeds had trouble flowering above the thirtieth parallel and were not resistant to frost. A 
solution was found by intrepid growers who imported strains of the plant from 
Afghanistan. Cannabis indica as it was referred to, is a shorter, stockier strain of 
marijuana, which was resistant to frost.
357
 Access to new genetics enabled American 
growers to compete with their Mexican counterparts. They were able to combine North 
America strains with cannabis from across the globe creating, in many regards, more 
plant variety among marijuana plants and greater potency. For the most part, domestic 
production occurred outside, but many brought the plant production inside. The type of 
production and the technology employed in growing indoors also contributed to changing 
the biology of the plant and also helped to increase the potency of the America pot 
supply.
358
 
Just as the 1940s and 1950s were a period of relative consensus about the evils of 
marijuana, the 1960s and 1970s were a period of contention over whether or not 
marijuana was a dangerous drug to begin with. The Reader’s Guide to Periodical 
Literature lists 105 articles on marijuana from 1960 through the first half of 1970. This 
certainly reflects a heightened interest in marijuana during this era both on the positive 
and negative spectrum. To compare with the previous decade The Reader’s Guide to 
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Periodical Literature lists five articles on marijuana from 1950 to the first half of 1960. It 
is clear that a portion of the American populace was increasingly questioning the 
government’s position on marijuana during the 1960s and 1970s. The government was, in 
turn, being given the push to decriminalize or legalize from the counterculture as well as 
from internal sources such as Kennedy’s Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug 
Abuse and Nixon’s Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. However, despite this 
the federal government maintained its war on marijuana. Not only did the government 
maintain its war it changed its tactics and allotted more and more money to address the 
supposed problem. The 1970s marked the first time the federal government had utilized 
an all out media war. The next chapter will delve more fully into the post-Nixon era, 
discussing the multi-state decriminalization of marijuana in the 1970s, the push for 
federal decriminalization under President Jimmy Carter as well as the ramping up of the 
“War on Drugs” under President Ronald Reagan. 
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Chapter Four: Decriminalization versus Just Say No 
The late 1970s and 1980s marked two disparate eras in the American War on 
Drugs: a period of relative acceptance of marijuana and a period of backlash against the 
drug. Marijuana was a hotly contested subject in American culture during these  
particular time periods. The post-Nixon era saw a push from a significant portion of the 
American public against the federal classification under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
and Control Act of 1970 of marijuana as a Schedule One “dangerous drug.” As a result of 
this pushback the 1970s saw the multi-state decriminalization of marijuana as well as 
President Jimmy Carter’s famous push for federal decriminalization of the drug. 
Whereas, the 1980s saw President Reagan’s declaration of a war against drugs, the Just 
Say No anti-drug youth organization and the second federally funded anti-drug media 
campaign. These two eras’ impact on the status of marijuana in American society will be 
discussed in detail.  
President Gerald Ford and Drug Abuse 
After President Nixon resigned in August 1974 amid the aftermath of the 
Watergate scandal, then Vice President Gerald Ford took over as president and as the 
Commander in Chief in the War on Drugs. Yet President Ford was not nearly the 
enthusiastic drug warrior that President Nixon had been. President Ford, rather than 
declaring his own War on Drugs declared a War on Inflation instead.
359
 Despite President 
Nixon’s multi-front War on Drugs and its purported successes, President Ford publicly 
acknowledged that the drug abuse problem in the United States was getting worse.
360
 In 
comparison to his predecessor, however he seemed to do very little to combat the 
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increasing drug problem. That is not to say that President Ford did nothing to combat 
drug abuse in the United States, he simply had a different agenda and different priorities 
for his presidency.  
President Ford still held Drug Abuse Prevention Weeks during his presidency like 
President Nixon before him; however, he did not employ the Advertising Council to aid 
in the media representation of the anti-drug week. A presidential proclamation issued at 
the beginning of each Drug Abuse Prevention Week represented President Ford’s major 
contribution to the week. President Ford’s first such proclamation was perhaps more 
liberal than past proclamations from President Nixon despite remaining a staunch 
Republican. He called on Americans to reach out and accept former drug users back into 
the fold. 
For without a way back into society, the former addict still is prey to the 
pressures and pointlessness that contributed to his abuse in the first place. 
Let us begin, this week, to search out techniques and resources we will 
need to help former drug abusers find their place in productive society--
techniques and resources that will complement the work presently being 
carried out at the 1,240 Federally funded treatment centers  . . . in more 
than 350 communities across the Nation.
361
 
 
President Ford’s rhetoric was more forgiving towards former drug users as he seemingly 
wanted to help them rather than merely demonize them as President Nixon had.  
As President Ford had a different agenda than President Nixon had, he did not 
continue the federal anti-drug media campaign under the aegis of the Advertising 
Council. The absence of anti-drug public service announcements did not mean that the 
media was silent about marijuana though. Headlines from Ford’s presidency regarding 
marijuana included primarily anti-marijuana messages. For instance in 1974, Reader’s 
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Digest proclaimed “Marijuana: More Dangerous than You Know.”362 In that same year 
Time heralded the “Perils of Pot.”363 In 1975 Good Housekeeping’s cover shouted 
“Special: The Alarming New Evidence about Marijuana’s Effects.”364Despite the 
presence of these anti-marijuana messages in the media, there were no federally funded 
media messages as there were during the Advertising Council’s anti-drug campaign 
under President Nixon.  
Like President Kennedy in the early 1960s, President Ford sought to reassess 
aspects of the federal treatment of illegal drugs and their users. In 1975 President Ford 
enlisted a presidentially appointed committee, the Domestic Council on Drug Abuse Task 
Force, “to undertake a thorough review and assessment of the adequacy of the Federal 
drug program.”365 The group was comprised of representatives from the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, the Department of Labor, the Department of State, the Department 
of Treasury, the Veterans’ Administration, and the National Security Council.366 The 
group reported back to President Ford in September of 1975 and published the White 
Paper on Drug Abuse. The Domestic Council’s recommendations dealt with a variety of 
drugs, including heroin, barbiturates, amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. The White 
Paper on Drug Abuse documented the key findings of the Domestic Council, assessed the 
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extent of drug abuse in the United States, and presented recommendations for “improving 
the Federal government’s overall program to reduce drug abuse.”367 The Domestic 
Council on Drug Abuse Task Force emphasized that: 
the optimism about ‘winning the war on drugs’ expressed so eloquently 
and confidently only a few years ago was premature. It urgently 
recommends that the federal government reaffirm its commitment to 
combating drug abuse and that public officials and citizens alike accept 
the fact that a national commitment to this effort will be required if we are 
to ultimately succeed.
368
 
The Domestic Council on Drug Abuse Task Force endorsed a federal demand reduction 
program, which was “intended to: dissuade the nonuser from experimenting with drugs; 
deter the occasional user or experimenter from progressing to the abuse of drugs; make 
treatment available for abusers of drugs who seek it; and help the former abuser regain 
his place as a productive member of society.”369 In regards to marijuana, the Domestic 
Council on Drug Abuse Task Force found that marijuana was the most commonly used 
illegal drug, finding “an estimated 20 percent of Americans above the age of 11” having 
used the drug at least once.
370
 The Domestic Council, echoing the findings of President 
Kennedy’s White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, also found that 
marijuana use had moved away from being primarily restricted to the African American 
and the Latino communities. The Domestic Council reported that marijuana use was 
“greater among those with higher levels of education and income.”371 The group warned 
President Ford that there was an increasing availability of very potent strains of 
marijuana with much higher levels of THC than of those strains being illegally imported 
from Mexico, saying that “unlike common forms of marijuana, these potent strains are 
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known to have serious physical and social effects on the user.”372 According to scholar 
Michael Pollan, this was due to a combination of domestic production and better 
technology utilized by growers, which were both unintended consequences of the U.S. 
foreign drug policy.
373
 However, the Domestic Council did not see marijuana as a high 
priority for drug treatment since most marijuana users in treatment were referred there by 
the criminal justice system and reported using the drug “less than once a week.”374 
Overall, the Domestic Council on Drug Abuse Task Force recommended that “public 
policy should be most concerned with those drugs which have the highest costs to both 
society and the user, and with those individuals who have chronic, highly intensive 
patterns of drug use.”375 Marijuana was not one of the drugs the Domestic Council on 
Drug Abuse Task Force felt deserved much public policy focus. President Ford took the 
Domestic Council’s suggestions into serious consideration, attempting to implement 
some of the policy suggestions. When he received the report, he certainly seemed ready 
to take action. He stated that: 
In order to assure prompt implementation of this report, I am directing 
each Federal agency with direct program responsibility to analyze and 
respond to the white paper within the next 60 days. I am also directing that 
the report be released to help refocus the current public dialog on drug 
abuse.  
This Administration is firmly committed to improving the quality of life 
for all Americans. Clearly, drug abuse has no place in our society. I 
believe the white paper outlines in realistic terms the drug abuse problem 
this Nation faces and presents for my consideration comprehensive 
recommendations for ways in which the Federal Government, working 
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with State and local governments and the private sector, can control drug 
abuse.
376
 
 
Despite this declaration, President Ford did not make any public policy changes 
regarding marijuana.  
One achievement of President Ford’s administration was to try to help consolidate 
the anti-drug bureaucracy with the rescission of funding for the Office of Drug Abuse 
Policy.
377
 Although the rescission of funding for Office of Drug Abuse Policy was later 
undone by President Jimmy Carter, it still marked an effort by President Ford to control 
the unnecessary spread of bureaucracy within the federal government at a time of 
economic recession when budget cuts were necessary. President Ford also continued 
President Nixon’s policy of foreign marijuana crop eradication, particularly Mexican 
crops, despite public outcry against paraquat, the herbicide used for such eradication 
programs. Other than eradication programs, his policies did little to change the status quo 
regarding marijuana even though President Ford’s personal stance on marijuana laws was 
not as harsh as President Nixon’s. In the Columbus Evening Dispatch, he was quoted as 
saying “more people are hurt by criminal laws against marihuana use than are hurt by the 
drug itself.”378 It was this particular idea that would be openly embraced by the next 
presidential administration. 
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President Jimmy Carter and Decriminalization 
The War on Drugs took a significant turn during the presidency of Jimmy Carter 
regarding marijuana specifically. During Carter’s presidency four states decriminalized 
marijuana. Eleven states in total had decriminalized marijuana by 1978 including: Alaska 
(1975), California (1975), Colorado (1975), Maine (1975), Minnesota (1976), Mississippi 
(1977), Nebraska (1978), New York (1977), North Carolina (1977), Ohio (1975), and 
Oregon (1973).
379
 During that same time period at least one branch of the federal 
government, the Executive branch, was interested in reconsidering the federal stance on 
marijuana. President Carter believed that: 
marijuana continues to be an emotional and controversial issue. After four 
decades, efforts to discourage its use with stringent laws have still not 
been successful. More than 45 million Americans have tried marijuana 
and an estimated 11 million are regular users.
380
 
 
President Carter asserted further that: 
penalties against the possession of a drug should not be more damaging to 
an individual than the use of the drug itself; and where they are, they 
should be changed. Nowhere is this more clear than in the laws against 
possession of marijuana in private for personal use. We can, and should, 
continue to discourage the use of marijuana, but this can be done without 
defining the smoker as a criminal. States which have already removed 
criminal penalties for marijuana use, like Oregon and California, have not 
noted any significant increase in marijuana smoking. The National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse concluded five years ago that 
marijuana use should be decriminalized, and I believe it is time to 
implement those basic recommendations.
381
 
 
Make no mistake; President Carter was not lobbying Congress to legalize marijuana. He 
supported legislation to amend federal drug law, eliminating the penalties “for the 
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possession of up to one ounce of marijuana.”382 This would mean that fines would be 
issued for possession of marijuana, not criminal penalties such as prison sentences. The 
states would also be free to enact their own laws regarding marijuana. This was 
something that President Nixon’s National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse 
suggested years before and President Carter was simply trying to follow through on those 
well-researched recommendations. President Carter made it clear, though, that the 
international drug traffic in marijuana would still be punished with significant jail time. 
Thus, importing marijuana would still be illegal.  
President Carter claimed not to have made these recommendations to Congress 
because he supported marijuana use. He, in fact, asserted quite the opposite. 
I am especially concerned about the increasing levels of marijuana use, 
which may be particularly destructive to our youth. While there is certain 
evidence to date showing that the medical damage from marijuana use 
may be limited, we should be concerned that chronic intoxication with 
marijuana or any other drug may deplete productivity, causing people to 
lose interest in their social environment, their future, and other more 
constructive ways of filling their free time.
383
 
 
Many members of Congress sincerely considered President Carter’s request for marijuana 
to be decriminalized on a federal level. According to scholars Albert DiChiara and John 
F. Galliher, “both U.S. senators and representatives argued that middle- and upper-class 
college students, on the road to professional careers, should not be incarcerated for 
marihuana possession because such users would lose respect for a law their experience 
tells them is incommensurate with the danger of the drug.”384 This marks a significant 
shift in not only who was viewed as a marijuana user, but also how they were viewed by 
those in power. 
                                                          
382
 Ibid.  
383
 Ibid.   
384
 DiChiara and Galliher, “Dissonance and Contradictions,” 47. 
120 
 
Federal decriminalization of marijuana never came to fruition. Ultimately 
President Carter was forced to abandon his campaign for decriminalization. This 
abandonment of such an important issue for him was most likely due in part to leaked 
reports in the press of marijuana use and other drug use among senior White House staff. 
An official Justice Department investigation into these claims was suggested by the 
Republican Senate minority leader.
385
 These claims made President Carter appear soft on 
drugs to the public and helped to erode any Republican support he had. In order to 
decriminalize marijuana on a federal level, Carter needed wholehearted support of the 
majority of Republicans as well as his own party, but this scandal made that all but 
impossible.
386
 He was criticized for not fulfilling this campaign promise and abruptly 
changing his stance on the matter. In this instance and others, he was criticized for his 
waffling. President Ford had even called him out on this tendency to flip flop on issues in 
the 1976 presidential campaign.
387
 This tendency and the fact that he did not achieve 
many of his goals as president might have cost him the election and marijuana the chance 
at relative public acceptance and decriminalization. However, regardless of whether or 
not federal decriminalization of marijuana was achieved or not, the fact that it was 
seriously considered by some of the most powerful individuals in the United States shows 
a significant shift in attitude from the days of the post-Marihuana Tax Act consensus 
regarding the evils of marijuana. 
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President Ronald Reagan and “Just Say No” 
After 1978 no additional states decriminalized marijuana. That is not to say that 
there was no push for decriminalization by other states, but votes in other states such as 
Iowa and North Carolina were met with defeat. Perhaps those states such as California, 
which had decriminalized the drug, had found the special formula for acceptability 
among voters and other states simply could not find a successful formula for their own 
voters’ approval. Regardless, the open policy window for marijuana decriminalization 
closed on a state and national level.  
After the marijuana decriminalization experiment of the late 1970s failed, there 
was a very significant pushback from the federal government and conservative members 
of American society. This backlash was apparent when looking at the headlines of the 
nation’s periodicals. In 1980 Ladies’ Home Journal featured “Battle against Pot: How 
Parents are Fighting to Keep Children Off.”388 The same year The Saturday Evening Post 
showcased two anti-marijuana articles “Putting a Match to the Marijuana Myth” and 
“Marijuana: the Myth of Harmlessness Goes Up in Smoke.”389 And The New York Times 
Magazine heralded the “New Parental Push against Marijuana.”390 These titles may seem 
on the surface similar to those during Gerald Ford’s presidency in a period of growing 
acceptance of marijuana but there were two key differences--the sheer volume increased 
(according to the Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature) as did the focus on parental 
action against the drug. The new administration embraced the backlash against marijuana 
and those voters who supported it. The Reagan administration was the polar opposite of 
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the Carter administration on marijuana use and drug use in general. President Ronald 
Reagan made it his mission during his presidency to create a drug-free America. There 
would be no drug decriminalization on his watch. His administration particularly struck 
out against marijuana and cocaine use.  
President Reagan was only the second president to officially declare a War on 
Drugs. According to scholar William N. Elwood, the televised speech in which President 
Reagan officially declared his War on Drugs was a narrative melding of metaphors about 
war and illness. This speech was not a State of the Union Address, but rather a sit-down 
with the president and his wife Nancy in their living quarters in the White House, a feat 
unheard of before. In order to make his message more palatable to the American public, 
Reagan talked to his audience as if he was personally familiar with them, talked with an 
aura of optimism, used anecdotes and “folksy terminology.”391 In his declaration of war, 
President Reagan asked all Americans young and old to be intolerant of drugs and their 
users. However, by utilizing an illness metaphor the speech offered a different 
perspective, one that absolved people of blame for their addictions and instead 
concentrated on the drugs and drug criminals as enemies in the War on Drugs.
392
  
This speech and others like it were powerful rhetorical tools utilized by President 
Reagan, also known as the Great Communicator, in order to disseminate his anti-drug 
messages to the masses. President Reagan understood the power of discourse especially 
televised rhetoric in shaping public perceptions, perhaps more so than other past or 
present U.S. presidents. According to Elwood, Ronald Reagan’s anti-drug rhetoric 
allowed him to appear as a strong leader who was tough on crime as well as concerned 
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with domestic issues.
393
 Elwood, in turn, described modern presidents like Reagan as the 
“ultimate PR men.”394 In many regards this was quite true.  
Because the person who defines an issue is also the president of the United 
States, the office he holds simultaneously legitimizes the perspective his 
definition provides. In other words, a presidential definition limits the 
realm of discourse about an issue and the range of possible policy 
resolutions about it.
395
 
 
The messages inherent in President Reagan’s anti-drug rhetoric were bold, yet 
simple. President Reagan most often used images and metaphors regarding war and 
illness when describing the drug abuse problem in America.
396
 Historian William N. 
Elwood contended that President Reagan’s illness metaphors in the context of a 
declaration of a War on Drugs enabled him “to define a domestic policy initiative that 
subjugates a portion of citizens as enemies in the War on Drugs.”397 President Reagan 
often spoke of zero tolerance towards illegal drugs.
398
 This was a radical departure from 
the Kennedy, Ford, and Carter administrations, which attempted to review whether or not 
drug laws during their administrations were too harsh. Reagan asserted that “zero 
tolerance” was not just mere words to his administration. It was a strong policy, which 
the administration will follow with determination. He warned that those who sell and buy 
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drugs will not be tolerated any longer and they will be stamped out like the parasites to 
society that they are.
399
  
President Reagan wanted to separate his War on Drugs and his rhetoric from the 
pack of past presidents. In November 1983 he spoke about the changing tide in 
perception about drugs in America. 
No longer do we think of drugs as a harmless phase of adolescence. No 
longer do we think of so-called hard drugs as bad and so-called soft drugs 
as being acceptable. Research tells us there are no such categories, that the 
phrase ‘responsible use’ does not apply to drug experimentation by 
America’s youth. And as far a recreational drugs is concerned, I’ve never 
in my life heard a more self-serving euphemism by those who support 
drug use. There is nothing recreational about those children who have 
been lost, whose minds have been ruined. If that’s somebody’s idea of 
recreation, it’s pretty sick. Too often we’ve fallen into the trap of using 
nice, easy, pleasant, liberal language about drugs. Well, language will not 
sugar-coat overdoses, suicides, and ruined lives.
400
 
 
President Reagan was very much an advocate of public involvement and, in turn, 
public responsibility for fighting the War on Drugs. He was very vocal about this. 
President Reagan felt that to deny public responsibility and “to rely on the government 
totally is to fall prey to an illusion.”401 He asserted that “the use of illegal drugs and abuse 
of alcohol can no longer be shrugged off as somebody else’s business . . . it’s 
everybody’s business—every man, woman, and child who loves his country, community, 
and family.”402 He also urged American children to simply say no to drugs, asserting that 
“each time you say no to drugs, you’ll be helping America beat one of the most serious 
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challenges we’ve ever faced” and “you’ll be a hero in my book.” President Reagan even 
urged civic organizations to use the power of their voices in the War on Drugs. He 
pushed for them to: 
talk with your local and district prosecutors about getting tough on the 
lowlifes who are selling drugs to our kids. Talk to your local religious 
leaders about what they can do about drug abuse. This is a moral as well 
as a health and safety issue. Meet with business and labor leaders in your 
community. You may find that many are working on getting drugs out of 
the workplace. You have much in common. And lastly, set up a 
partnership; get others involved in this fight. Now may be the time for 
communities across America to launch an offensive against drugs. 
403
 
 
To the Reagan administration the War on Drugs was more than a pet project, it 
was a moral crusade that the nation had to win. The first step was not necessarily to stop 
the flow of drugs into the nation despite that being an integral part of the War on Drugs. 
President Reagan felt that:  
The first step, of course is making certain that individual drug users and 
everyone else understand that in a free society we’re all accountable for 
our actions. If this problem is to be solved, drug users can no longer 
excuse themselves by blaming society. As individuals, they’re responsible. 
The rest of us must be clear that, while we are sympathetic, we will no 
longer tolerate the use of illegal drugs by anyone. The time has come for 
each and every one of us to make a personal and moral commitment to 
actively oppose the use of illegal drugs, in all forms and in all places. We 
must remove all traces of illegal drugs from our nation.
404
 
 
President Reagan’s rhetoric was a powerful tool in the War on Drugs, making an 
indelible print on America’s psyche. However, it was not the only tool his administration 
utilized in fighting the War on Drugs. 
Like presidents before him, President Ronald Reagan, too, held Drug Abuse 
Prevention Weeks during his presidency. Each year he issued a proclamation at the 
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beginning of the designated week. The weeks were renamed several times during his 
presidency to reflect the change in strategy in the War on Drugs. They were referred to as 
“Just Say No” Week in the early years of his presidency and “Drug-Free America” Week 
in the latter half of his presidency. In his last Drug-Free America Week in October 1988, 
he issued a thoughtful assessment of progress that had transpired and promise for the 
fight to continue. He urged Americans to remember that “there is no safe use of illegal 
drugs” and that drug dealers and users should and would be held accountable for the 
plague upon society, which were illegal drugs.
405
 A powerful element during these weeks 
was the participation of civic groups and corporations. In 1982 the Keebler Company and 
Warner Communications produced an anti-drug comic book together. In 1983 the 
Chemical People Project produced an anti-drug special to air on PBS.
406
 In October 1988 
the National Federation of Parents for a Drug-Free Youth observed that week as National 
Red Ribbon week. The red ribbon symbolized the commitment to a drug-free life.
407
 
Nancy Reagan was in her own right a very powerful voice in the War on Drugs. 
She was the “co-captain in our crusade for a drug-free America.”408 Unlike previous 
administrations from the era of the American War on Drugs from President Woodrow 
Wilson to President Jimmy Carter, President Ronald Reagan’s First Lady was very 
involved in the War on Drugs. First Ladies before her often had a pet project. In her 
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mind, on the other hand, she had a moral crusade and her part was to assist in educating 
the nation’s youth about the dangers of drugs. At an elementary school in Oakland, 
California in 1982 Nancy Reagan created the tagline for a generation, “Just Say No,” 
when a child asked her what she and her friends should do if ever offered drugs.
409
 She 
played a major role in the formation of the Just Say No youth anti-drug organization as 
thousands of schoolchildren took inspiration from her simple answer and within months 
of her speech clubs started popping up across the country. This organization was based 
on the simple pledge of saying no to drugs. As of January 1989 there were 12,000 Just 
Say No clubs nationwide.
410
 Nancy Reagan was responsible like her husband, President 
Reagan, for some memorable anti-drug rhetoric. She was frequently quoted as saying “we 
must create an atmosphere of intolerance for drug use in this country.”411 This intolerance 
especially applied to marijuana as she came to equate marijuana users with accomplices 
to murder. She spoke specifically about the “ignorant idea” that casual use of marijuana 
was a victimless crime. 
The notion that the mellow marijuana user doesn’t hurt anyone is just as 
phony. As a result of an intensive effort by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in Guadalajara, Mexico, and particularly Special Agent 
Enrique Camarena, over 10,000 acres of marijuana that were ready for 
harvest and eventual sale in the United States were destroyed. And this 
caused a major financial loss for a notorious trafficking group. On 
February 7, 1985, less than 3 months after the destruction of the 10,000 
acre plantation, Special Agent Camerena was kidnapped by the traffickers. 
He was tortured and beaten to death. And this country’s casual marijuana 
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users cannot escape responsibility for their fellow American’s death, 
because they, in effect, bought the tools for his torture.
412
 
 
Nancy Reagan’s rhetoric may have been extreme in some circumstances, but it was bold 
and certainly memorable. Without Nancy Reagan by his side, one wonders if President 
Reagan’s War on Drugs would have been as successful or as memorable. 
Another major tool in President Reagan’s War on Drugs as with President 
Nixon’s was a federally funded anti-drug media campaign. However, President Reagan 
wanted a new and different spin on the issue of drug abuse as well as to avoid some of 
the pitfalls that Nixon’s campaign had endured. One such pitfall was that a good majority 
of television stations that carried the anti-drug public service announcements would often 
air them in the wee hours of the morning or late at night rather than alongside primetime 
programming. President Reagan personally requested that anti-drug service organizations 
play their part in righting this wrong by urging their “local television stations to air public 
service announcements--and I mean at a time when most people are watching TV, not 
burying them in the middle of the night with reruns of ‘Bedtime for Bonzo.’”413 
President Reagan continually emphasized that the cure for drug abuse “is going to 
be turning . . . our young people off” to drugs.414 He also emphasized anti-drug education 
and not scare tactics as being key to achieving this.
415
 The anti-drug media campaign was 
created to foster this cure. In 1983 the National Institute on Drug Abuse, a federal 
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agency, hired the Needham, Harper and Steers Advertising Agency under the aegis of the 
Advertising Council to create “a comprehensive public service advertising campaign that 
focuses on drug abuse prevention.”416 The campaign was created at the behest of the 
President Reagan and the First Lady. The purpose of the campaign was to “increase and 
maintain the public’s attention on the health consequences of drug abuse; to increase 
awareness of the psychological consequences of illicit drug-taking; and to promote 
changes in societal attitudes towards the problem.”417 The multi-media advertisements 
targeted youth as well as parents and teachers who served as the “primary agents of 
prevention and change.”418 The federal government, specifically the Reagan 
administration as well as the National Institute on Drug Abuse, wanted this campaign to 
use a direct and factual approach unlike previous campaigns, which offered alternative 
activities to drug abuse as well as too general anti-drug messages. The campaign was 
basically two-pronged in nature. The first prong was the acceleration of the decrease in 
marijuana use. The second prong was the extension of this downturn to other drugs. A 
major goal of the campaign was to delay the first use of drugs, particularly marijuana, 
among twelve to fourteen year olds.
419
 The strategy the Advertising Council proposed to 
utilize in order to achieve that was “to convince teens that they don’t have to use drugs to 
be ‘cool.’”420 The ad copy would supply “current information about the negative effects 
of pot and pills.”421 The two basic themes for the campaign were “Just Say No,” geared 
towards teenagers and “Get Involved in Drugs Before Your Children Do” geared towards 
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parents. The anti-drug campaign included anti-drug advertisements in a variety of media 
formats, including radio, television, print ads, informational booklets, billboards, etc. 
Many of these advertisements were focused primarily on marijuana.  
For instance the print advertisement “Head of the Class” featured a picture of 
schoolchildren in a classroom staring at a fellow student asleep at his desk. The text was 
as follows: 
The head of the class. There are two kinds of heads. The ones that wind up 
excelling in school. And the ones that smoke pot and do drugs. Which 
head you turn out to be can be as easy as resisting an offer of drugs with a 
simple no. Just say no. You’d be surprised how well it works.422 
 
Another print advertisement, “Dynamite Weed,” featured a picture of a marijuana joint. 
The text was as follows:  
What do you say to someone who offers you some dynamite weed? Say 
no. Or no thanks. Or bug off. Or get lost. Or take a walk. Say no because 
drugs can make you seem slow-witted and mindless in a society that 
rewards alertness and brightness. So say no. Please. It’s a decision that can 
affect your whole life.
423
 
 
An informational booklet simply entitled “Marijuana” was issued by the Ad 
Council in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services. It included 
thirteen questions and their answers. The questions included basic ones such as “What is 
Marijuana?” and “What are the dangers for young people?” It also included more 
complicated questions such as “How long do chemicals from marijuana stay in the body 
after the drug is smoked?” as well as “What about psychological dependence on 
marijuana?” The booklet made some interesting assertions some true, some questionable. 
It claimed that the “strength of today’s marijuana is as much as ten times greater than the 
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marijuana used in the early 1970s.”424 This exact figure is hard to prove, but according to 
scholar Michael Pollan better growing technology and different genetics utilized in 
domestic production did indeed create a stronger drug plant.
425
 It also made claims of 
marijuana causing infertility and lung cancer. None of these claims were accompanied by 
a citation of the study that the information purportedly came from. However, the booklet 
served its function as anti-marijuana propaganda. 
The anti-marijuana messages were just part of the ad campaign. More general 
“Just Say No” to drugs messages appeared frequently during the campaign. The focus 
shifted unexpectedly though. After just over two years the Advertising Council was 
directed in 1985 by the National Institute on Drug Abuse and President Reagan to switch 
the focus of the Drug Abuse campaign from “Just Say No” to a more specific focus on 
cocaine abuse.
426
 This change of focus did not mean that marijuana was now acceptable 
or that President Reagan felt that the campaign had indoctrinated enough young minds 
against the evils of marijuana. The campaign shifted most likely in response to the public 
outcry against the crack cocaine epidemic in American cities.  
On August 4, 1986, President Reagan at a question and answer session with 
reporters contemplated the successes of the War on Drugs as well as a new strategy for 
winning the War. He noted that: 
we’ve waged a good fight. The military forces have dramatically reduced 
drug use by 67 percent. We’ve been on the offensive attacking the 
peddlers, the transporters, the smugglers, the growers—everyone who’s a 
part of the international network that channels drugs into America’s 
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neighborhoods and communities. Arrests are up, confiscations are up, 
cooperation with other nations has increased. 
427
 
 
In many regards, President Reagan was extremely optimistic and sought to achieve the 
impossible as he called for the nation to unite “as one people, together united in purpose 
and committed to victory . . . a drug-free generation.”428 He truly believed that he could 
stop the War on Drugs and negatively impact demand for illegal drugs by teaching the 
drug user to simply say no to drugs. It was with that optimistic spirit that President 
Reagan announced six goals, which if achieved would end the War on Drugs. The first 
step was to create a “drug-free workplace for all Americans.”429 Drug testing for Federal 
employees was to get the ball rolling on this initiative. The second step was a drug-free 
educational system from grade school through college. President Reagan’s third step was 
to get drug users into drug treatment programs. The fourth goal was to increase 
international cooperation, especially in regards to drug trafficking. The fifth goal was to 
strengthen law enforcement efforts especially at our Southern border. The final goal was 
primary, prevention and awareness.  
We must expand public awareness and prevention. Now, we’ve come a 
long way on this front. Attitudes are changing; so, now is the time to enlist 
those who have yet to join the fight. We can do this by reaching out to all 
Americans and asking them to join Nancy’s drug abuse awareness and 
prevention campaign; taking a stand in every city, town, and village in this 
country and making certain drug users fully understand their fellow 
citizens will no longer tolerate drug use; disseminating credible and 
accurate information about the danger posed by drugs. Users should know 
we are concerned and there is legitimate reason to be concerned.
430
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A month later, President Reagan and his wife Nancy addressed the nation from their 
living quarters in the West Wing of the White House, an event unheard of before. This 
was the aforementioned speech in which Reagan officially declared a War on Drugs. He 
had used war metaphors before in other speeches, but unlike those previous declarations 
this was to the nation and not to members of Congress or other small groups of 
Americans. Reagan noted that shortages of marijuana had been reported and use of the 
drug was down among high school students. However, the war was not won yet. Mrs. 
Reagan appealed to the American family to take up “arms” in the War on Drugs.  
Drugs take away the dream from every child’s heart and replace it with a 
nightmare, and it’s time we in America stand up and replace those dreams. 
Each of us has to put our principles and consciences on the line, whether 
in a social setting or in the workplace, to set forth solid standards and to 
stick to them. There’s no moral middle ground. Indifference is not an 
option. We want you to help us create an outspoken intolerance for drug 
use. For the sake of our children, I implore each of you to be unyielding 
and inflexible in your opposition to drugs.
431
 
 
Together the Reagans were a seemingly unstoppable team when it came to the 
War on Drugs. However, despite their best efforts and unflinching optimism the War still 
rages on and the American people still try to assert their free will in regards to marijuana 
use and drug use in general. 
As seen in this chapter the status of marijuana changed dramatically in some 
circumstances in the 1970s, but returned to the status quo in the 1980s. However, 
marijuana in American society underwent a period of transformation after the Reagan 
era. President George H.W. Bush declared War on Drugs and continued the anti-drug 
media campaign. President Clinton carried on the War despite his sketchy past with 
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marijuana. President Clinton experienced some pushback from the states regarding 
marijuana. As in the mid 1990s states began again to question federal laws regarding 
marijuana, especially the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970 and its classification of marijuana as a Schedule One drug. States beginning with 
California made a move not towards decriminalization, but towards legalizing medical 
marijuana. For some cannabis had come full circle from beneficial plant to dangerous 
plant and finally back to a plant with medicinal benefits. 
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Conclusion 
 “Just Say No!” and “Just Do It!” are two slogans that historian William N. Elwood 
began his book Rhetoric in the War on Drugs: The Triumphs and Tragedies of Public 
Relations by analyzing.  
The first slogan tells citizens to rely on their inherent moral fortitude and 
eschew temptation; in contrast, the second slogan provides citizens 
permission to engage in pleasurable activities, to pursue their happiness.
432
 
 
These two slogans represent contradictory values in American society, which together 
serve to complicate the War on Drugs. These inherently conflicting slogans, therefore, 
represent the key reasons why this war will never be truly won. These conflicting 
sentiments are precisely the reason the United States will never truly stamp out marijuana 
use within its borders.  
  As evidenced by the previous chapters, Cannabis sativa Linne clearly shares a 
complex relationship with mankind, especially with Americans. 
Armies and navies have used it to make war, men and women to make 
love. Hunters and fisherman have snared the most ferocious creatures, 
from the tiger to the shark, in its herculean weave. Fashion designers have 
dressed the most elegant women in the supple knit. Hangmen have 
snapped the necks of thieves and murderers with its fiber. Obstetricians 
have eased the pain of childbirth with its leaves. Farmers have crushed its 
seeds and used the oil within to light their lamps. Mourners have thrown 
its seeds into blazing fires and have had their sorrow transformed into 
blissful ecstasy by the fumes that filled the air.
433
  
 
This simple plant with five-fingered leaves has been transformed in American culture 
from a plant with many helpful and socially accepted uses to a plant demonized for its 
ability to produce a euphoric high. In order to discover why this occurred, I attempted to 
answer the following questions. When and why did the federal government initially 
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embark on a War on Drugs? When and why did it focus on cannabis? Who were the key 
actors in the war’s creation and perpetuation? What specific methods did the federal 
government use to fight this war? Together the answers to these questions combine to 
illuminate a picture of the American War on Drugs that is marked by the government and 
citizen in constant struggle to control the meaning and use of drugs including marijuana. 
Ultimately the War on Drugs is a paternalistic campaign to assert control over American 
citizens’ personal behavior. 
  I contend that the War on Drugs began in 1914 with the passage of the Harrison 
Narcotics Tax Act. Many scholars would concur with this assertion, including historians 
Richard J. Bonnie, Charles Whitebread II, and David Musto. In addition, Arthur Benavie 
argues that there were drug war rumblings in many states including California, but these 
state laws and local ordinances were merely the precursor to the war. The Harrison 
Narcotics Tax Act was the first shot fired in the War on Drugs. He went further by stating 
that the Supreme Court’s 1919 interpretation of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act in Webb 
v. United States, which denied addict maintenance, really gave birth to the American War 
on Drugs.
434
  
  On the other hand, many scholars argue that the War on Drugs began at alternate 
points in American history. For instance, Martin Alan Greenberg argues that president 
Richard Nixon’s 1971 televised declaration of a “war on drugs” marked the real 
beginning of the war.
435
 Whereas, this moment in American history was significant for its 
use of the medium of television and it being the first declaration of war on drugs by a 
U.S. President, it was not the beginning of the American War on Drugs. War did not need 
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to be declared literally by the Commander-in-Chief for a war to have begun. The 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was the first federal legislation to regulate narcotics, then 
defined as opium and cocaine. This law served a model for future legislation and 
encouraged anti-drug reformers to push for more legislation such as the Eighteenth 
Amendment. With this law a consensus emerged: “the nonmedical use of ‘narcotics’ was 
a cancer which had to be removed entirely from the social organism.”436 This accord 
against drug addiction and the drug experience had been building since the 1870s.
437
 It 
was finally expressed in the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. It was this consensus that lay at 
the heart of the genesis and the perpetuation of the American War on Drugs. 
  The Marihuana Tax Act was a significant turning point in the War on Drugs. It 
turned the focus of the American War on Drugs onto cannabis for the first time. 
Specifically it marked a point in American history when cannabis was no longer solely 
viewed as the plant that produced hemp. The Marihuana Tax Act on the surface was not 
supposed to negatively impact the production of hemp. However, ultimately hemp 
farmers were lumped in with narcotic addicts as it became impossible for farmers or 
anyone for that matter to comply with the Marihuana Tax Act, to legally possess or grow 
cannabis. The Treasury Department failed to follow through on its duty to make a tax 
stamp, thus making it impossible for anyone to register as an authorized manufacturer 
and pay the necessary tax. Hemp production was now illegal and to this day the source of 
legal hemp in the United States is other nations such as the Philippines.  
  Hemp being left by the wayside, cannabis was now viewed on a national level as 
marijuana, a drug. Why this occurred is complex. Drug warriors such as Dr. Hamilton 
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Wright, Harry J. Anslinger, and other Progressive activists felt that cannabis should be 
included in anti-narcotic legislation. They were influenced by the sentiment that narcotics 
were an evil that must be eliminated from the lives of American citizens. The average 
American knew relatively little about marijuana and what they did know came from 
sporadic sensationalistic stories in newspapers, which did not connect hemp and 
marijuana together.
438
 These few, but lurid newspaper accounts helped contribute to the 
belief among middle class Americans that marijuana was a drug associated with 
Mexicans, “crime and the deviant life style in the Black ghettos.” Americans were so 
uneducated about marijuana that in New York the Federal Bureau of Narcotics felt it 
necessary to educate members of the New York City police department as to what 
marijuana looked like, so that they would be able to identify it on the streets.
439
 It was 
this “cannabis confusion” that led not only to a national consensus in the 1950s among 
the American population regarding the supposed evils of marijuana, but the passage of 
the Marihuana Tax Act. 
  Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics were key players in the 
War on Drugs and particularly in its focus on cannabis. The agency itself was created as a 
result of the war. Commissioner Anslinger was the head of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics for thirty-two years. During that time, he exerted a great deal of influence on 
the legal status of drugs in our nation as well as the perception of drugs among 
Americans. He was a very shrewd bureaucrat who was good at keeping his bureaucracy 
relevant and funded. Anslinger skillfully “cultivated the media and effectively used 
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citizen groups that opposed narcotics.”440 He was very careful to maintain strong ties 
between himself, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and Congress. He also fostered ties 
between the FBN and local law enforcement agencies. His dramatic and compelling 
testimony was integral in getting the Marihuana Tax Act through the House Ways and 
Means Committee. From the 1930s through the 1950s, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
and Commissioner Anslinger proselytized about the evils of marijuana. They attempted 
to link cannabis with immigrants and criminality.
441
 Their efforts contributed to a relative 
consensus in the 1950s regarding the evils of marijuana. However, this consensus was not 
as strong as it seemed and would collapse in the 1960s and 1970s. 
  Besides the Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, other 
notables in Washington, D.C. have played integral roles in the creation and perpetuation 
of the American Drug War. From Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama, American 
presidents have played a key role in the perpetuation of the War on Drugs. I would argue, 
though, that Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan were the most enthusiastic drug warriors 
to occupy the Oval Office.  
  In June 1971 in a televised speech President Nixon announced a “war on 
drugs.”442 He was the first president to do so. President Nixon did perhaps more than any 
previous president in an attempt to combat drug use in the United States. Besides urging 
Congress to pass the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, he 
launched “Operation Intercept,” began a three year media campaign in conjunction with 
the Advertising Council, Inc., mandated Drug Abuse Prevention weeks four years in a 
row (1970-1973), and established the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse.  
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Nixon’s anti-drug media campaign was revolutionary and memorable, with the often 
utilized tagline “why do you think they call it dope.” It was the first federally funded anti-
drug media campaign, targeting different generations and ethnicities. The campaign had a 
scope and reach that was dwarfed Anslinger’s anti-drug educational campaign. Whether 
or not the campaign was effective is questionable, as drug use was on the rise in the 
1970s and marijuana was decriminalized in multiple states after Nixon’s presidency.  
  In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan significantly ramped up the War on Drugs. 
He made it his mission during his presidency to create a drug-free America, striking out 
particularly against marijuana and cocaine use. President Reagan was only the second 
president to officially declare a War on Drugs. To the Reagan administration the War on 
Drugs was more than a pet project--it was a moral crusade that the nation had to win. 
President Reagan was a master at anti-drug rhetoric. Together he and his wife Nancy 
Reagan made an indelible mark on the War on Drugs. Their rhetoric further complicated 
the status of marijuana in the nation by helping to polarize the public. Nancy Reagan 
even called casual marijuana users accomplices to murder.
443
 President Reagan 
emphasized anti-drug education and not scare tactics as being key to achieving a drug-
free nation.
444
 As with President Nixon before him, President Reagan utilized the 
Advertising Council to create an anti-drug media campaign. This campaign’s slogan was 
borrowed from Nancy Reagan’s catchphrase “Just Say No.” It was a powerful and 
memorable campaign. Whether or not it actually prevented drug use is questionable, but 
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it did spark interest in the anti-drug movement, and helped lead to the creation of over 
12,000 Just Say No clubs nationwide.  
  As evidenced by the previous chapters, laws were the main tool utilized by the 
federal government to fight the War on Drugs. From the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Tax 
Act to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, the 
American government utilized anti-drug laws to attempt to control the personal behavior 
of its citizens. Laws were effective weapons in the War on Drugs, but were not infallible. 
Other weapons needed to be utilized for drug warriors to combat drug use in America.   
Another tool utilized by federal drug warriors was media, including newspapers, 
print advertisements, radio addresses, televised speeches, and public service 
announcements. In regards to marijuana specifically, media was used to proselytize about 
the evils of marijuana. Prior to the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and the efforts of 
Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the national 
consciousness was not filled with images of marijuana, let alone images of marijuana as a 
hard drug. After the passage of the law, the media and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
significantly contributed to the feeling that there was a growing national drug menace. 
Anslinger and his agency actively conducted a national educational campaign for federal 
legislation regarding marijuana. They sent stories to the press on the dangers of marijuana 
and even travelled around the nation distributing anti-marijuana propaganda.
445
 This is 
evidenced by the fact that Anslinger himself authored many anti-marijuana articles. 
Nixon’s anti-drug media campaign as well as Reagan’s Just Say No campaign both 
demonized marijuana. All of the various anti-marijuana media expressions discussed 
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depict marijuana as an alien intrusion capable of destroying innocent lives and 
transforming normal individuals into sex-crazed, violent, or insane people. 
  Presidential anti-drug rhetoric was another weapon in the War on Drugs. 
American presidents like Nixon and Reagan made specific rhetorical choices in regards 
to drugs which often had the added effect of making them appear tough on crime. 
Presidential rhetoric often helped to shape public policy and public perception regarding 
drugs.  
  Regardless of the successes and failures of the War on Drugs or perhaps because 
of the successes and failures, the national view of cannabis did indeed change from hemp 
to marijuana. The government succeeded in changing the legal status of the cannabis 
plant. Cultivation of cannabis became a crime dooming not only marijuana, but the fiber 
crop hemp. For the most part, hemp fell by the wayside and cannabis became marijuana 
in the eye of the federal government as well as the American people. However, the 
government did not succeed in dictating to the public that marijuana was a dangerous 
drug. In many regards, the federal government assumed that public opinion had 
crystallized regarding the cannabis question and that it favored the “suppression of a drug 
with such evil effects.”446 The government was, on one hand, being given the push to 
decriminalize or legalize from the counterculture as well as from internal sources such as 
Kennedy’s Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse and Nixon’s 
Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. However, despite this the federal 
government maintained its war on marijuana. Not only did the government maintain its 
war, it changed its tactics and allotted more and more money to address the supposed 
problem. The 1970s marked the first time the federal government had utilized an all out 
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media war. The movement to decriminalize marijuana in the 1970s was also indicative of 
this lack of complete acceptance among the American public as well as the push for the 
legalization of medical marijuana in the 1990s. The War on Drugs continues to this day 
and the federal campaign against marijuana including the media campaign rages on. This 
fact alone shows that the government has not succeeded in its efforts to convince the 
American population that marijuana is a dangerous drug without any redeeming value. 
As more states follow California in legalizing medical marijuana, one wonders if the 
federal government will one day abandon its war against cannabis. Will hemp once again 
be legally grown in this nation? Will marijuana ever be legalized or decriminalized on a 
federal level? The status of cannabis in American history is very complicated and will 
serve as fodder for many more historical studies in the future. 
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